DEMOCRATIC DECENTRALIZATION AND PROMOTION OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN URBAN DEVELOPMENT OF BANGLADESH: A STUDY ON KHULNA CITY CORPORATION, KHULNA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND JESSORE MUNICIPALITY

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List of Content

CHAPTER 07
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Abbreviations

KCC	Khulna City Corporation
KDA	Khulna Development Authority
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
KII	Key Informant Interview
ADB	Asian Development Bank
NOC	No Objection Certification
DPP	Development Project Proposal
PC	Planning Commission
LGRD	Local Government and Rural Development
LGED	Local Government Engineering Department
CRDP	City Region Development Plan
UPHCSDP	Urban Primary Health Care Services Delivery Project
DFID	Department for International Development
TLCC	Town Level Coordination Committee
WLCC	Ward Level Coordination Committee

Executive Summary

The success of decentralization highly depends upon the improvement of local government's accountability. Since, there are various forms of accountability according to various contexts, but in respect to decentralization concept, accountability mainly involves with the relationships between the local governments and the central government as well as with their citizens. Since, problems to accountability in decentralization vary with the practiced forms of decentralization, but there are some momentous reasons of creating problems to local government's accountability (both upward accountability and downward accountability). Though the decentralization process exists in Bangladesh, the accountability issue is a major challenge for urban development in Bangladesh. In this context, this research was an attempt to identify the upward and downward accountability issues associated with urban development. In addition this research identifies whether there are any impacts of organizational arrangement of decentralization on the promotion of accountability issues in urban development practices of Bangladesh.

The mixed method research strategy was adopted in this study. The study was conducted on Khulna City Corporation, Khulna Development Authority and Jessore Municipality to evaluate their performance in implementing accountability issues in their urban development activities. Specific methods utilized for the data collection process included analysis of grey materials, household questionnaire surveys, focus group discussions and key informant interviews. The household close-ended questionnaire survey was performed in order to collect quantitative data whereas a number of qualitative data collection techniques such as key Informant Interview (KII) and focus group discussion (FGD) were used to collect qualitative data. A sample of 218 respondents were carefully selected for two cities (Khulna and Jessore) which provided an estimate P for an attribute, perception on an item, with a std. error of 6.5%. The margin of error at 93.5% confidence level for an estimate is equal to twice, i.e. 2 times the standard error of the estimate.

Khulna City Corporation represents the organizational form of devolution for delivering services to city dwellers. It has been observed that Khulna City Corporation did not allow any community participation in road construction and maintenance services as almost 95% respondents never participated in the process of constructing or maintaining local roads. In KCC there is no system of registering formal complaints for road maintenance services as more than 95% respondents agree that informal negotiations with ward councilors or local political are the major means to get services. A large proportion of the respondents (52%) expressed their dissatisfaction with KCC in the case of road fixing. Similarly, most of the respondents (64%) expressed their dissatisfaction with cleanliness of local roads in their neighborhoods. Nearly 90% residents feel that the current frequency of waste collection does not meet their needs. It has been observed that only 10% of total respondents attended public hearings of municipal budget, but they confirm that the public hearing meetings were not participatory and city residents can only get information about municipal budget and other matters. This study identifies that a large number of respondents state they are not satisfied with City Corporation, mainly because of failure to implement citizen's priorities. Similarly, many respondents state that they did not feel free to express their opinion and also they confirm that KCC did not have enough initiatives to protect vulnerable people from abuses. Along with, a large number of residents state that they are not conscious about their participation in local government events.

In terms of participation in the decision making process of KCC, it has been observed that most of citizens participate at the local level through indirect mechanisms (89 percent), such as maintaining good network with ward councilors, local political leaders and City Corporation officials more often than through direct mechanisms, such as participation in public hearings, meetings and petitions. The findings of FGDs and key informant surveys also justify the households' survey findings. The FGDs reveal that the house owners maintained informal networks with local ward councilor in order to get their tasks done. In many cases,

citizens without having personal connections sought help from middleman who already had an informal relationship with the City Corporation or was an employee of City Corporation. The residents' participation is limited largely because they feel that this participation would ultimately be ineffective in helping them influence local decision making. Similarly, the figure also shows that 61% participants of household survey agree that awareness of local governance can affect their tendency to participate in local government meetings and planning of infrastructure development. Sense of urgency is another socio-cultural factor that affect participants' tendency to participate in local governance process. About 60% participants believe that the residents became motivated to participate when they saw themselves as being potentially negatively affected by the decisions of local government. Many respondents (more than 25%) also perceived economic condition as one of the determinants of willingness to participate. The above findings and discussions comprehensively explain why the level of community participation is low in Khulna City Corporation. The empirical study summarizes that individual's unwillingness to participate could result from individual's lack of awareness, discouraging perceptions about participation outcomes and most notably lack of institutionalization process in the planning system. Consequently, it results in a tendency to avoid participation. Therefore ensuring transparency and accountability through peoples participation has not been institutionalized in KCC.

Khulna Development Authority represents the organizational form of delegation for delivering urban services. Khulna Development Authority (KDA) is a semi-autonomous organization under the Ministry of Public Works and Housing of Government of Bangladesh. The main functions of KDA are (i) to prepare the master plan of the city and its vicinity; (ii) to develop the city following the master plan; and (iii) to control the development. A look into the planning processes adopted by KDA confirms that it upholds the core principles of community involvement. Relevant planning documents clearly outline the requirement of three-tier participation of the public for decision-making. It emphasized participation in demand mediation, formulating planning standards and in designing development. However, it is reported that only selected representatives from relevant public departments, professional groups, civil society organizations, business groups, media, political leaders and academics were consulted to determine the preliminary design of plan preparation process. In KDA there is no single unit to support the land owners for preparing the supportive documents for issuing No Objection Certification (NOC) of land use clearance. In addition there is no grievance redress mechanism in place to accommodate the complaints from the land owner. Hence the planning permission process is not accountable. It has been observed that 86.3 percent of the respondents are paying speed money to KDA officials, architectural firm or other agents outside of KDA for getting NOC. Among these informal channels KDA officials (81.4%) are getting mostly this type of speed money.

As per the section 23 of Khulna Development Authority ordinance, 1961, KDA provides feedback to the clients about their building plan permission. It has been observed that in most cases violation of setback rule is a common feedback from KDA (35.5%). Other feedbacks include adequacy of road width, violation of master plan proposals, fault in building design, problems of land entitlement and easement deed. These types of feedback without having any grievance redress mechanism causing another layer of corruption. As the complaint system is not accountable and the citizens are often using informal channels to resolve these feedbacks. It has been observed that during the KII that the complaint system is not accountable and often the feedbacks are directly provided by the chairman himself. The aforementioned issues have direct impact on the satisfaction index of the residents regarding the planning permission process and resulting through the violation of setback in the individual household level while they are constructing their buildings.

A survey of the selected neighborhoods revealed that more than 98% of respondents did not get involved in the planning process of KDA. However 98% has the willingness to participate in planning process. Among those who want to participate, around 45% would like to attend

community/ward level decision making process. However KDA has no provision for such decision making process. This study reveals that public hearings largely attracted those who perceive that they might be negatively affected by the proposed plan (18.4%). Others (23%) want to participate to get the information only. Therefore the level of participation is not referring active citizenship which can make KDA more accountable to the residents. The study findings highlight the planning agency's limitations in building up public awareness of the planning process or making a genuine effort to consult local residents to minimize potential conflicts. Furthermore, it was observed that there was no provision made within the procedure to allow further follow-on updates or feedback for those who are affected by the decision of KDA. There was similarly no provision for grievance redress mechanism to inform the community as to whether or not their objections or suggestions were incorporated in the activities of KDA.

Jessore Municipality is one of the oldest municipalities in Bangladesh. It was established in 1864. As a local government organization Jessore Municipality represents the organizational arrangement of devolution and the sole agency for urban development activities. Jessore municipality is performing the services defined by the Local Government (Paurashava) Act, 2009. It has been observed that Jessore municipality allows community participation in road construction and maintenance services as almost 74% respondents participated in the process of constructing or maintaining local roads. Indeed, these respondents participated voluntarily and through their community in the road construction process in their neighborhoods. They are all self-motivated people who steer the process of constructing new roads or repairing old roads by overseeing Jessore municipality's road construction activities. The strong presence of Ward level coordination committee (WLCC) and Town level coordination committee (TLCC) is a determining factor for such participation. It has been observed that there is a formal system of placing a complaint regarding road construction and maintenance at Jessore municipality and 34% of the respondents have used this service and they usually got the feedback within six months after complaining.

Decisions on various urban development functions, such as planning for infrastructure facilities, regular monitoring of the services, approval of municipal budget, etc., are taken in the meetings of the Jessore municipality. Representation of residents is a distinctive feature in these meetings of Jessore municipality. In Jessore, there are two different level of citizen committee; one is ward level coordination committee and another is town level coordination committee. Meetings are held periodically during which resolutions are passed on the basis of voting. According to Local Government (Paurashava) Act, 2009 participation in municipal meetings is not restricted to any category of person and may include the elected, nominated and ex-officio members, and other appointed authorities/officers associated with the local government. Besides, every meeting is open to the public. Jessore municipality allow its citizens to take part in the local government events such as council meetings, public hearing, town level coordination meetings and municipal assembly. The representation of ward level coordination committee and town level coordination committee is very significant in the governance structure of Jessore municipality. It has been observed that 48% of total respondents attended public hearings of municipal budget.

Before constructing any building a plot owner needs to apply for a permission of building construction as per the Local Government (Paurashava) Act, 2009. The findings from questionnaire survey reveal that out of 50 households 88% directly applied for the plan permission but it has been observed that they are paying speed money (54% of the respondents) to avoid unnecessary delaying in the process. In most of the cases they are paying it to Jessore municipality officials. It has been observed that Jessore municipality is giving feedback regarding building plan permission. It has been observed that in most cases violation of setback rule is a common feedback from Jessore municipality (36%). Other feedbacks include fault in building design and problems of land entitlement. These types of feedback have been well acknowledged by the respondents. As it has been observed that 76% of the respondents are satisfied by getting the feedback and only 10% registered the

complaints for these feedbacks. Revision of building plan is a common mechanism to accommodate the feedback and 90% of the respondents reported that after necessary correction the building plans were approved. While asking them about the complaint procedure they informed that the networking with ward councilor is a major issue to solve this type of problem. However, it has been observed that the grievance redress mechanism is functional in Jessore municipality. The above findings and discussions comprehensively explain why the level of community participation is higher in Jessore municipality. Incorporating communities while implementing project; independent complaints cell as grievance redress mechanism; participatory budgeting process; regular standing committees' meetings; and TLCC and WLCC meetings ensuring active participation of diversified group of people in the governance structure of Jessore municipality.

In terms of transparent and democratic decision-making process it has been observed that Khulna City Corporation which represents the organizational arrangement of devolution has few limitations. In the case of Khulna Development Authority, the scenario is very threatening in terms of transparent and democratic decision-making process regarding urban development functions. As this organization is representing central government under the organizational arrangement of delegation they are more reluctant about citizens' participation and perception as well. In the case of Jessore Municipality citizens are participating in decision making process through Ward Level Coordination Committee and Town Level Coordination Committee. It has been observed that the Local Government (Paurashava) Act, 2009 has specific recommendations for TLCC and WLCC but the Local Government (City Corporation) Act, 2009 lacks this provision. Therefore this study recommends for the amendment of the Local Government (City Corporation) Act, 2009 to make TLCC and WLCC mandatory for ensuring democratic decision making in KCC. However citizens' skeptical attitudes about the effectiveness of participation and their limited knowledge of government process have been observed. Therefore this study recommend that organizations could develop communication strategies and iterative processes to: (i) inform citizens about local government policies, programs, services, and initiatives; (ii) more effectively listen to the public; and (iii) respond to citizens' needs and incorporate their opinions into local government actions.

To ensure accountability this research identifies that there is a burning question among the citizen that 'whom should I ask for any services'. Therefore procedural clarity is a major function for making an organization accountable. It has been observed that in the case of KCC most of the respondents confirm that they did not register any formal complaints, but they informed ward-councilor and city corporation officials informally for solving any issues reading urban development. A large number of the respondents believe that informal process is more effective than formal one. Some respondents state that there is no formal system of registering complaints. In the case of KDA, the study found KDA has limited procedural justice; that the information seekers of KDA do not have the access to use the form for any services. These respondents get information verbally from the reception desk. Reception desk staffs only give direction to the service seekers towards respective service department. This impedes bar to citizens' accessibility to a particular quality of service that is responsive to their needs which also indicates limited awareness among actual or potential information seekers of KDA regarding citizens' right to get information. Therefore this study recommends that separated nodal section should be institutionalized for receiving the grievances/ complains from the citizens in general and from the service recipients in particular deploying with a senior official as nodal/focal person who will facilitate the development and implementation of the grievance mechanism.

During this study it has been observed that there is a problem of institutional cooperation in case of formulating the physical development projects for local areas. There is no established legal mechanism by which communication among public authorities in Khulna city is possible to maintain. In the case of Jessore city it has been observed that there is no problem in terms of institutional cooperation at the local level. However, dependency on central government

for project and budget approval restricts their potential to perform in different urban development activities. In Khulna city, Khulna City Corporation as a local government and Khulna Development Authority (KDA) as planning Authority have responsibility to make coordination with each other. It has been identified that in case of any important issue, KCC has opportunity to invite the members of other organization to participate actively in the meeting of KCC under section 49(15) of Local Government (City Corporation) Ordinance, 2009. But the problem is that there is no binding obligation of other organizations to participate in the meeting of KCC. As a result, the participation of KDA depends on the will of high officials. Considering this issue this study recommends that a coordination board is essential that will be represented with different governments, civil society, private and community organizations.

This study concludes that local government organizations in the form of devoluted organization (KCC and Jessore Municipality) are more accountable rather than the delegated form (KDA) of decentralization. This study also advocates for incorporation of civil society organization irrespective of the organizational arrangement of the local level organizations that are performing urban development activities. This study identifies that pro-accountability arrangements cannot be expected to arise spontaneously from devolution, but need to be intentionally structured. Therefore it can be concluded that where a single form of decentralized organization exist there is no problem of upward accountability. In terms of downward accountability which relates to the ability of the organization to be accountable to citizens; there is still some room for maneuver to ensure active citizen participation. The case of Jessore municipality justifies this aforementioned claim. However in the case of Khulna city where two different form of decentralized organization exist then the problem of upward and downward accountability prevails in a larger extent. Therefore this study recommends for better coordination mechanism among Khulna City Corporation and Khulna Development Authority.

1.1 Background

Globally, over the years, it has been observed a shift on the prominence of development strategies for promoting economic growth in such a way that may lead equitable growth to satisfy the basic and sustenance needs of the urban poor. Restructuring city governance was a major element of such transformation (Devas, 2001). The fundamental transformation to promote good governance was emerged in two ways; firstly, the perceived success of market economies and inefficiencies of state enterprises and secondly, the abuses of authoritarian regimes (Rondinelli, 1981). In this conflictive arena in different literature democratic decentralization was put forward as a mean for promoting good governance. The forms of decentralization are manifested on the basis of functions, authorities and/or resources being allocated from central government to local government. In this research the form of decentralization will be analyzed on the basis of organizational arrangement of decentralization identified by Devas (2001). The organizational arrangement for decentralization[1] can be explained in four ways; namely as deconcentration, delegation, devolution and privatization.

The success of decentralization highly depends upon the improvement of local government's accountability. Since, there are various forms of accountability according to various contexts, but in respect to decentralization concept, accountability mainly involves with the relationships between the local governments and the central governments as well as with their citizens. Since, problems to accountability in decentralization vary with the practiced forms of decentralization, but there are some momentous reasons of creating problems to local government's accountability (both upward accountability and downward accountability[2]). One major concern that has constrained the quality of accountability, particularly in developing countries, is the issue of funding and the financial dependency of local bodies (Devas, 2001). Evidence has shown that central government uses financial power as a tool to influence local government (ibid). The common accountability problems in different form of organizational arrangement of decentralization are corruption, lack of transparency, etc. When accountability is absent in any form of decentralization, corruption expands and it is natural for all forms of decentralization (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005). Other problems of accountability can be explained as the reduction of local government's performances in context of effectiveness and efficiency especially for service delivery functions for its citizens (ibid).

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[1] In most of the literature, **deconcentration** refers to handing over some amount of administrative authority or responsibility to lower levels within central government ministries and agencies. Another organisational arrangement for decentralisation is **delegation**, which transfers managerial responsibility for specifically defined functions to organisations that are outside the regular bureaucratic structure and that are only indirectly controlled by the central government. **Devolution** is the creation or strengthening financially or legally of sub national units of government, the activities of which are substantially outside the direct control of the central government. In this process of decentralisation, **privatization** has been assumed as a tool for providing services and facilities.

[2] Since, there are various forms of accountability according to various context, but in respect to decentralization concept, accountability mainly involves with the relationships between the local governments and the central governments as well as with their citizens. Accountability context, these relationships of local government are known as upward accountability and downward accountability. Upward accountability is the accountability of local governments to the Central government where the local governments are given certain functions and authorities to implement mandates given by the Central government who develop an accountability mechanism to guarantee the local governments' compliance with government's mandate (Net, 2009). Downward accountability is the ability of the government to be accountable to citizens (ibid.).

The urge for good governance in Bangladesh is not the outcome of the urge of democratic decentralization; rather democratic decentralization is patronized by the constitution. The common forms of organizational arrangement of decentralization in urban development are the organizations under the process of devolution and delegation. In this process organizations under the process of devolution constitute local urban government bodies (city corporations and municipalities). Delegated organizations can be represented by different city development authorities. Though the devolution and delegation process exists in Bangladesh, the accountability issue is a major challenge for urban development in Bangladesh. In this context, this research is an attempt to identify the upward and downward accountability issues associated with urban development. In addition this research identifies whether there are any impacts of organizational arrangement of decentralization on the promotion of accountability issues in urban development practices of Bangladesh.

1.2 Objectives
The main objectives of this research are:
- Measuring accountability of decentralized organizations in relation to urban development;
- Identifying the interrelationship between the organizational form of decentralization and promotion of accountability measures in urban development practices.

1.3 Significance of the Study
This study is the first attempt to analyze the upward and downward accountability issues of urban development practices in Bangladesh. The urban development practices include service delivery, plan preparation and plan implementation. This study explores whether different organizational arrangement produces different outcomes in respect of promoting accountability issues in urban development practices. In this context this study was conducted on Khulna City Corporation and Jessore Municipality, where these two organizations are of the same form of organizational arrangement of decentralization (devolution). However, the context varies as the form is different as Jessore is a municipality and Khulna is a city corporation. In addition, analyzing the accountability issues of Khulna Development Authority provides another lens in this study as this organization represents the organizational form of delegation. Therefore this research is significant to identify which form of organizational arrangement is more functional to promote accountability issues in urban development practices of Bangladesh.

DECENTRALISATION, URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

2.1 Governance and Urban Development

The term good governance is defined as a 'quality' of governance that focused on the further requirements of the process of decision-making and public policy formulation (Santiso, 2001). According to Minogue (1997, p. 21) good governance is a 'reform strategy' of governance, where that strategy was particularly used to 'strengthen the institutions of local society with the objective of making government more accountable, more open, transparent and more democratic." Governance refers to the procedures and trends according to which public policy decisions are formulated and practiced (Wilde et al., 2008). On a deeper level, governance can be defined as public processes of policy making which apply to the processes of decisions that are made by and for public. Governance is defined by the UNDP (2001) as the complex ensemble of mechanisms, processes, and institutions through which citizens and social groupings manage their interests and conflicts. Additionally, the UNDP (2001) characterizes governance as the set of machineries, procedures and associations, through which public and civil societies communicate their interests, apply their citizenry rights and commitments and reconcile their dissimilarities.

Establishment of good governance in good public management and administration process has now considered as predominant agenda for development workers, social researchers, scholars and international donor agencies. Developing nations see good governance as decentralized, legitimized, and participatory government: that is, mainly focused on pursuing development through empowering people, eradicating corruption, ensuring legally binding and accountable administrations to achieve pro-people developments, which ultimately boost economic growth through the highest use of development by the people (Andrews & Shah, 2003). Urban development planning also seeks good urban governance. Urban development planning can be defined as a process that combines policy making process, planning system and plan implementation process (Devas, 2001). The conceptual framework of planning system also complies with the basic notion of good governance. The following figure shows the conceptual framework of planning system.

Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework of Planning System

Understanding the aforementioned conceptual framework it can be observed that while introducing and popularizing the concept of good urban governance, the UNDP- TUGI (2006) has adopted the 11 principles of good urban governance put forwarded by the UNDP and the UN-Habitat Global Campaign on Good Urban Governance. These are participation; rule of law; responsiveness; consensus orientation; equity; effectiveness and efficiency; accountability; security; subsidiarity; strategic vision; and security (UNDP, 2004). Laquain (1995) suggests that the governance of metropolitan regions needs to achieve the following main factors: efficiency in the delivery of urban services; equity in urban society; economic development; and environmental sustainability. Based on innovative views supported by Laquain (2005), good governance is a process in which the problems of urban society in various physical, social, economic and managerial sectors can be solved and settled by collective efforts depending on public power. Moreover Good Governance is an all embracing concept with sustainable urban development as its central objective. The following framework summarizes the link between governance and urban development.

Figure 2.2: Interrelationship of Good Governance and Urban Development

Source: Modified from Hall and Pfeiffer, 2000

2.2 Governance and Decentralization

As explored in the earlier section that the notion of governance seeks institutional reform. Therefore literature in this field shows that the shift from government to governance refers therefore to a move away from centralized and hierarchical structures of government towards a collaborative approach with social agencies and non-governmental actors, including the private sector. One important effect of this shift has been to blur the distinction between state institutions and civil society (Hirst, 2000). In these terms, governance can then be conceptualized as a move towards decentralization, whereby the shift from government to governance can be paralleled with the change from centralization to decentralization.

In other words, by considering the main basics of the decentralization process, it can be generalized into a process of shift from government to governance. However, while decentralization takes place through a set of political, administrative, organizational and

financial bottom-up shifts, to arrive at the governance arena a sort of transformation in power, tasks and decision-making through a top-down approach is required. At the same time, it is important to recognize that decentralization alone cannot ensure the formation of governance, although governance can be supported and affected by the decentralization process and its mechanisms (Rumbach, 2015). Moreover, urban decentralization vests greater authority in local governments and officials, with the goal of improving city governance. As Miller and Bunnell (2013) argue, decentralized urban governance has the potential to make cities and urban areas "potential sites of innovation in addressing challenges related to urban growth…and the management of resources for livable and sustainable urban environments" (716).

The term of decentralization embraces a variety of definitions in development discourse. Brillantes defines decentralization as "the transfer of functions, powers, responsibilities and accountabilities to lower level institutions for better governance" (Brillantes, 2004:34). Specifically, Johnson looks at decentralization as a new doctrine of democracy when he defines democratic decentralization as "meaningful authority devolved to local units of governance that can be accessible and accountable to local citizenry, who enjoy full political rights and liberty" (Johnson, 2001: 523). He further explains that it differs from the vast majority of earlier efforts at decentralization in the 1950s when most of initiatives were made in public administration without any serious democratic component. In a general term, decentralization is a process that transfers powers of decision making, planning and control over resources from the central government to lower levels of government.

There are various reasons claimed by different regimes to adopt the decentralization. It is mainly argued that decentralization can help central government be closer to its citizens because it gives the government better information about citizens' preferences and give more opportunities for citizens to easily monitor government officials' performance. The central government is also potentially better able to monitor the performance of local agencies. At local level, decentralization can improve bureaucratic accountability while citizens are better able to communicate their problems, concerns to local politicians. This results in an improvement of the compact between local politicians and local bureaucracy (Campos and Hellman, 2005). In another words, decentralization is supposed to improve levels of public participation, bureaucracy accountability, administrative efficiency and responsiveness to local needs, among other goals (Fritzen and Ong, 2006).

Johnson et al. (2004) suggested that decentralization can be based on four forms of organizational arrangement, namely deconcentration, delegation, devolution and privatization. In most of the literature, deconcentration refers to handing over some amount of administrative authority or responsibility to lower levels within central government ministries and agencies (Johnson et al., 2004, Abbot, 1997 and Morgan, 2011). Another organizational arrangement for decentralization is delegation, which transfers managerial responsibility for specifically defined functions to organizations that are outside the regular bureaucratic structure and that are only indirectly controlled by the central government. When deconcentration and delegation works effectively, then to spread up the benefit of democratic government devolution is necessary.

Devolution is the creation or strengthening financially or legally of sub national units of government, the activities of which are substantially outside the direct control of the central government. In this process of decentralization, privatization has been assumed as a tool for providing services and facilities (Devas, 2001). However, the success of democratic decentralization through deconcentration, delegation, devolution and privatization has been questioned in different literature (Ha, 2004, Devas, 2001 and Pal, 2006). The common argument behind the failure of such decentralization processes was the lack of understanding of the context which represents the varied nature of actors and their functions, rather than the conventional organizational arrangements (deconcentration, delegation, devolution and privatization) of democratic decentralization.

Understanding the above organizational arrangements for decentralization, it can be assumed that democratic decentralization as a process that redefines the role of different actors for providing services and facilities in a more collaborative and context specific way. This interpretation has been constructed by looking at the substantial shifts in economic paradigms globally [e.g. globalization] that are linked to changes in political attitudes in most parts of the world (Jenkins and Smith, 2001). These shifts have led to changing roles of the state and the market accompanied by an emergence and recognition of civil society (ibid, 2001). These new organizational relationships bring together the state, private sector and civil society in different combinations depending on the socio-economic and political circumstances in a given context. Thus it is essential to understand decentralization in a new dimension, which defines the organizational relations within and between these three actors. Therefore, in this regard, it is essential to understand the determinants that define different organizational relations and transformation of such relations. In most of the literature, rules and resources have been defined as the major determinants of organizational involvement in any development process (Healey, 2000 and Morgan, 2011). However, the differences in the application of rules in accessing resources happen when the capacity of the members of a given society differs.

2.3 Decentralization and Accountability

The third juncture of the literature review was to identify the issue of accountability. Accountability is seen as one of the cornerstone for the success of decentralization. It is a measure of responsibility that implies a relationship between a principle (account holder) and an agent (accountee). Answerability and enforceability are the key elements of genuine accountability (Goetz and Jenkin, 2005). Answerability refers to the obligation of government and its agencies, officials to provide information about their decision and action and to justify them to the public. Enforceability suggests that the public or the institution responsible for accountability can sanction the offending party or remedy the contravening behavior (World Bank, 2007a). In another words, answerability is to provide an account while enforceability is the punishment of poor or illegal performance. More generally, accountability is "a relationship in which one of actors (or group of actors) is able to keep in check the power of others (or group of actors)" (World Bank, 2007b: 7).

Accountability takes different forms in term of governance literature and based on features, country specific information, local power structures, interests and socio-economic conditions. According to Goetz and Jenkin (2005), there are two accountability mechanisms operating either along a 'vertical' axis and 'horizontal' axis. Particularly, vertical accountability is the external mechanism through which the non-state actors can hold government officials accountable. Meanwhile, horizontal accountability is the capacity to check and balance internal to state. In a general way, accountability is classified in accordance with forms of decentralization such as political, administrative and fiscal ones. Political accountability refers to the accountability of local leaders through local election as well as the performance of legislative branch with oversight committees. Fiscal accountability is simply based on formal financial accounting for the use of public resources. This includes "accountability for sound and transparent public expenditures and financial management systems, overall fiscal disciplines, allocation of resources to priority needs and efficient and effective allocation of public services according to an effective, efficient, transparent, and rule based public financial management system" (World Bank, 2007b: 36). Administrative accountability covers administrative decisions (i.e decision about recruitment, procurement, land use and planning, and so on) of local officials. Administrative accountability can be an upward, hierarchical relationship between the local government and higher levels of government and/or involves horizontal relations (World Bank, 2007b). Additionally, legal and constitutional accountability refers to the performance of the judiciary that is entrusted with ensuring that politicians and officials do not exceed their legal authority (Goetz and Jenkin, 2005)

In recent years, social accountability has been recognized by World Bank as a compliment to strengthen to political, fiscal and administrative ones. Its prevailing view is that social accountability is "an approach toward building accountability that relies on civic engagement – in which ordinary citizens and/or civil society organization demand accountability" (World Bank, 2007b: 10). The authors of this report also emphasize that due to the limitation of electoral and public accountability, it requires concerted civic education efforts during the decentralization process. The instruments used by citizens to hold government accountable vary. These include traditional practices such as public demonstrations, protests as well as participatory budgeting, administrative procedures acts, social audits, and citizen report cards (World Bank, 2007b). Besides, diagonal accountability refers to the direct engagement of citizens in the workings of horizontal accountability institutions. This is an effort to "augment the limited effectiveness of civil society's watch dog function by breaking the state's monopoly over responsibility for official executive oversight" (World Bank, 2007a: 3). The main principles of diagonal accountability include (i) participating in horizontal accountability mechanisms, (ii) information flow (having an opportunity to access information about government agencies, the performance of the government agency), (iii) compelling officials to answer, (iv) having capacity to sanction. However it is argued by World Bank that social accountability is broad enough to encompass mechanisms of diagonal accountability.

Accountability in decentralization context mainly involves the relationships between the local governments and the higher governments as well as with their citizens. It means that local governments have to take both upward and downward accountabilities. Upward accountability refers to the accountability of local governments to the higher levels. The local governments are given certain functions and authority to implement mandates given by the higher governments who develop a mechanism of accountability to guarantee the local governments' compliance with mandate. Downward accountability relates to the ability of the government to be accountable to citizens. The upward and downward accountability of local governments are distinct but interlinked, deeply affecting each other (World Bank, 2007b)

Based on theories and concepts of decentralization and accountability, an accountability framework is developed by World Bank (2007b) to establish the linkage between accountability and good local governance as below.

Figure 2.3: Good Local Governance and Accountability

Source: World Bank, 2007b:12

In this framework, local government is at the centre of a web of accountability relationship. In some case, it can be the actor (accounter) while in others, it is the forum. The accountability relationships may be driven in multiple directions: upward, downward and diagonal. This will ensure more integrated systems where citizens have the ability and opportunity to demand accountability and local governments have means and capacity to respond to these demands (World Bank, 2007b).

3.1 Research Strategy

The research requires methods or research tools that provide a critical lens to analyze impact of democratic decentralization on urban development planning. The mixed method research strategy was adopted in this study. Specific methods utilized for the data collection process included analysis of grey materials, household questionnaire surveys, focus group discussions and key informant interviews. The household close-ended questionnaire survey was performed in order to collect quantitative data whereas a number of qualitative data collection techniques such as key Informant Interview (KII) and focus group discussion (FGD) were used to collect qualitative data. An open-ended checklist/survey format was used for all of the qualitative data collection instruments including key informant interviews and focus group discussions. Through the quantitative and qualitative survey, the study intends to generate greater depth of understanding of organizational arrangement of decentralization and their impacts on the promotion of accountability issues in urban development practices of Bangladesh.

3.2 Statistical Considerations for Determination of Sample Size

Households' responses on an attribute or characteristic could be measured as a proportion. The true value P for the proportion of an attribute (item) is unknown. The variance of an estimate p of P ignoring fpc (finite population corrections) is $\frac{PQ}{n}$ where n is sample size and population size N is very large (1.4 million in two cities, Khulna and Jessore). For attributes with P between 50% and 50% the standard error $\sqrt{\frac{PQ}{n}}$ changes very little and a sample of 218 can provide an estimate P with a standard error (std. error) estimated around 6.5%. Thus, a sample 218 respondents were carefully selected for two cities (Khulna and Jessore) which provided an estimate P for an attribute, perception on an item, with a std. error of 6.5%. The margin of error at 93.5% confidence level for an estimate is equal to twice, i.e. 2 times the standard error of the estimate. It is important that margin of error is converted as a factor of standard error to meet requirement of 93.5% confidence level in the estimate of a perception. In order to reduce cost of the field survey, this research preferred slightly higher standard error (6.5%) than 5%, which reduces sample size from 385 to 218.

3.3 Sample Design and Distribution of Sample

As explained in previous section, about 218 households were interviewed in two municipalities. The distribution of samples between two cities was followed according to proportion of total population. A total of 168 sample households were interviewed in Khulna city, whereas 50 households were selected as samples in Jessore city. Intra-city sampling was based on settlement clusters. In Khulna city, settlements were selected through following steps:

Step 1: Clusters were selected where planned residential areas are situated. Through this process, four clusters were identified.

Step 2: Outside these four clusters, all the residential areas are spontaneous or organically developed. Another 8 clusters were selected from spontaneous developed areas. The boundary of contiguous wards were merged into demarcate cluster boundary. The contiguous wards were determined based building densities within the wards. The whole process has been exhibited in the following map (Map 1).

A total of 12 settlements were selected in Khulna city for inclusion in the sample. On average, 14 houses or households were identified in each settlement or area/cluster, for a total of 12 settlements and 168 interviews. Data collection technique used face-to-face interviews in the respondents' household. Households were selected using a random walk technique to ensure equal representation of all types of households. Two criteria were used for respondent selection. First, the person in the household that provided information was the head of household, spouse, or other person who takes care of the household or represents the household in public. The second criterion was respondents' familiarity with the urban development planning functions of local government and development authority. At the beginning of each topic, interviewers asked to speak with the person who was best informed about that topic. Each interview lasted 40 minutes on average. Table 3.1 shows the distribution of the 168 households in terms of education, occupation and income, and respondent gender and age.

Map 01: Distribution of Sample Households in Khulna City Corporation Area

The distribution of socio-economic characteristics of the respondents of Khulna city is presented in Table 3.1. Table 3.1 reveals that the respondents of Khulna city are spread evenly amongst all of the age groups. It appears from the table 3.1 that a small proportion (4.8%) of the respondents is aged 75 and above. The respondents are mostly distributed among the age groups of 35-44 (12.5%), 45-54 (45.2%) and 55-64 years (27.4%). The remaining 10.1% are in the age group of 65-74 years and above. The mean age of the respondents is 53.58 years with a wide variation in age of the household heads (SD= 9.47). The minimum age of the respondent is 35 years, whereas the maximum age of the respondent is 85 years. According to table 4.1, female respondents represent 9.5% of the total respondents; whereas male respondent constitutes 90.5%. In the survey the head of the household has been given priority for providing data and therefore most of the respondents come from male headed households. Most of the respondents have a good educational background (Table 3.1). Out of 168 respondents, only one respondent was found who never attended school. Only few respondents (2.4%) had elementary education. Another 10.1% respondents had completed primary school but did not finish secondary education. A higher percentages of the respondents (44.6%) completed secondary school education. About 40.5% of total respondents completed their graduation and post graduation. Only 1.8% respondents had PhD.

The respondents in this research are mostly involved in a variety of occupations in urban formal sectors. Employment pattern of the respondents is generally presented in same table 3.1. According to this table 19% of total respondents are employed in government service. Another 20.2% respondents are involved in the private services. The respondents also work in other occupations like service in NGO or UN agencies (4.8%), self-employed in farming (5.4%), and business (35.1%). The table also shows that the remaining 15.5% of the respondents are unemployed but these people had retired from their jobs. The monthly household income indicates socio-economic status of the respondents. Here, income means income of a household for a month from all sources, such as house rents, property, salary and business. Table-4.1 shows that only 10.1% of total respondents have an income of 8000-20000 Tk. Another 19.1% respondents have an income of 21000-35000 Tk. More than 30% households have monthly income within Tk. 50000, while 27.4% respondents have monthly income between Tk. 51000 and Tk. 70000, and only 6% have monthly income between Tk. 70000-100000. Only 1.2% of total respondents were selected from very high income group whose income is more than 100000 Tk. in a month. The average household income of the respondents is 47130.95 Tk. But the intra-household income differential (std. dev. 23949.43) is very high due to the higher level of income of households with more members in the urban workforce.

Table 3.1: Socio-economic Profile of the Respondents of Khulna City

Age structure of the respondents		
Age	Frequency	Percent
35-44	21	12.5
45-54	76	45.2
55-64	46	27.4
65-74	17	10.1
75-84	8	4.8
Total	168	100
Sex of the respondents		
Sex	Frequency	Percent
Male	152	90.5
Female	16	9.5
Total	168	100.0
Education level of the respondents		
Level of education	Frequency	Percent
No education	1	.6
Elementary education	4	2.4

Primary completed	17	10.1
Secondary completed	75	44.6
Bachelor	46	27.4
Master	22	13.1
PhD	3	1.8
Total	168	100.0
Current employments of the respondents		
Current employment	Frequency	Percent
Unemployed	26	15.5
Government Service	32	19.0
Private Service	34	20.2
Service in NGO/UN	8	4.8
Self-employed in farming	9	5.4
Self-employed in own business	59	35.1
Total	168	100.0
Income level of the respondents		
Income level	Frequency	Percent
8000-20000	17	10.1
21000-35000	33	19.6
36000-50000	60	35.7
51000-70000	46	27.4
70000-100000	10	6
100000<	2	1.2
Total	168	100

Source: Field survey, 2016

In case of Jessore, two contiguous wards merged into one cluster and a total of 5 clusters were identified. 10 sample households were selected for interviewing from each cluster. A total of 50 sample houses or households were selected from 5 clusters. Table 3.2 shows the distribution of the 168 households in terms of education, occupation and income, and respondent gender and age. The distribution of socio-economic characteristics of the respondents of Jessore city is presented in Table 3.2. The data reveals that the respondents of Jessore city are spread evenly amongst all of the age groups. It appears from the table 3.2 that a small proportion (4.0%) of the respondents is aged 64 and above. The respondents are mostly distributed among the age groups of 34-43 (24%), 44-53 (54%) and 54-63 years (12%). The remaining 10.1% are in the age group of 24-33 years and above. The mean age of the respondents is 47.36 years with a wide variation in age of the household heads (SD= 9.4). The minimum age of the respondent is 24 years, whereas the maximum age of the respondent is 83 years. According to table 3.2, female respondents represent 8% of the total respondents; whereas male respondent constitutes 92%. In the survey the head of the household has been given priority for providing data and therefore most of the respondents come from male headed households. Most of the respondents have a good educational background (Table 3.2). Out of 50 respondents, only one respondent was found who had elementary education. Another 12% respondents had completed primary school but did not finish secondary education. A slightly higher percentages of the respondents (28%) completed secondary school education. About 58% of total respondents completed their graduation and post graduation. The residents in Jessore city are mostly involved in a variety of occupations in urban formal sectors. Employment pattern of the respondents is generally presented in same table 3.2 According to this table 16% of total respondents are employed in government service. Another 6% respondents are involved in the private services. The respondents also work in other occupations like service in NGO or UN agencies (16%) self-employed in farming (14%), and business (46%). The table also shows that the remaining 2% of the respondents are in labour based activities. Table 3.2 shows that only 12% of total respondents have an income of 4000-18000 Tk. Another 48% respondents have an income of 19000-33000 Tk. More than 30% households have monthly income within Tk. 48000 while 6% respondents have monthly income between Tk. 49000 and Tk. 63000.

Table 3.2: Socio-economic Profile of the Respondents of Jessore City

Age structure of the respondents

Age	Frequency	Percent
24-33	3	6.0
34-43	12	24.0
44-53	27	54.0
54-63	6	12.0
64-73	1	2.0
74-83	1	2.0
Total	50	100

Sex of the respondents

Sex	Frequency	Percent
Male	46	92.0
Female	4	8.0
Total	50	100.0

Education level of the respondents

Level of education	Frequency	Percent
Elementary education	1	2.0
Primary completed	6	12.0
Secondary completed	14	28.0
Bachelor	15	30.0
Master	14	28.0
Total	50	100.0

Current employments of the respondents

Current employment	Frequency	Percent
Government Service	8	16.0
Private Service	3	6.0
Service in NGO/UN	8	16.0
Self-employed in farming	7	14.0
Self-employed in own business	23	46.0
Labour based activity	1	2.0
Total	50	100.0

Income level of the respondents

Income level	Frequency	Percent
4000-18000	6	12.0
19000-33000	24	48.0
34000-48000	17	34.0
49000-63000	3	6.0
Total	50	100

Source: Field survey, 2016

3.4 Qualitative Methods

Focus-Group Discussions (FGDs): The focus group discussion is a widely used method in participatory research to get an in-depth understanding of the broad community context and social complexities. Two most important elements of a focus group discussion are the 'group' situation and an interesting 'topic' to ensure interaction between the group members (Bedford and Burgess, 2001)[3]. Focus group discussions technique will be used in this proposed project because it is argued, by scholars such as Morgan (1997)[4] that it is ideal for researchers committed to effecting social change and empowering the researched. This research was largely drawn on different socio-economic groups' experiences, and their

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[3] Bedford, T. and Burgess, J. (2001) The Focus-Group Experience In Limb, M. and Dwyer, C. (eds.) Qualitative Methodologies for Geographers, 121-135.
[4] Morgan, D.L. (1997) Focus Groups, Annual Review of Sociology, 22, pp. 129-152.

perceptions related to performance of local government and development authority. In each city, the research organized five focus group discussions with house owner associations. In Khulna, the research organized focus group discussions with house owner associations with Nirala, Sonadanga and Gallamary and in Jessore city, two FGDs were organized in ward no. 4 and 5. Therefore a total of 5 FGD sessions were conducted and about 45 participants were participated. Each of the group discussion sessions lasted for about one and half to two hours. The number of people who participated in the discussions ranged from eight to ten and all the group discussions were recorded with a digital tape recorder. The focus group discussions were used to cover following issues which are related to analyze urban development planning functions of local government and development authority:

- What are citizens' views of, and experiences with, service delivery and local governance?
- Community participation in planning of infrastructure development, urban service delivering process and urban planning functions;
- Socio-cultural factors affecting citizen's tendency to participate in the planning process;
- Citizen's aspirations to participate in decision making process;
- Citizen recommendations to improve the services.

Key informant interviews: This technique allows the researcher to select a number of individuals who have knowledge and experience. The main purpose of this data collection technique is to review providers' self-evaluation. The researcher had dialogues with ward councilors, engineers and planners, head of the departments of Khulna City Corporation, Jessore Paurashava and Khulna Development Authority. Total 20 key informants were selected for interviewing.

3.5 Case studies
The study explored 05 case-studies from two cities to identify governance in urban development planning. The case studies were explored on different sectors such as road construction and physical development; tax assessment; planning permission and plot distribution; local government events and master plan preparation. Descriptive analyses were performed to explain case studies.

3.6 Analysis and policy findings
The collected data and initial findings were analyzed and policy relevant findings were generated and disseminated. Qualitative data was analyzed using the themes, and coded. This enabled the study to generate theory from identification and groupings of concepts from coding of unstructured data. Thematic analysis is particularly helpful in analyzing unstructured data, such as those expressed by the occupation groups, socio-economic groups and other informants. Descriptive statistics were generated from quantitative data. Apart from this, rank-order analysis was performed with quantitative data. The respondents were then asked to rank the indicated factors according to their comparative importance in their perceptions, where higher value carried greater importance. The responses were put into a rank-order model in order to arrive at a quantifiable average rank value (R) and to demonstrate the relative importance of the identified factors in a graphical representation. Rank value was calculated from the individual rank based on a score of importance (4 or 5 being the highest and 1 the lowest) given to each factor by all respondents. Rank-order analysis is commonly used to measure preferences.

Figure 3.1: Model applied for rank-order analysis of participant realities towards participation

$$R = \frac{\sum((r_1 X f_1) + \cdots + (r_n X f_n))}{N}$$

[Here, R = Final rank value; r = Individual rank given by the respondent; f = frequency; n = No. of factors identified; and N = Number of total respondents]

Source: Adapted from Swapan, 2014

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF KHULNA CITY CORPORATION'S URBAN DEVELOPMENT PLANNING FUNCTIONS

4.1 Introduction

Organizations in urban areas are considered as important organizations for city dwellers. Because, local government authorities or the local offices of higher levels of government in urban areas try to protect the rights of better services for urban people (Satterthwaite, 2005:100-103). In Bangladesh, at each level of administration, except division, there are provisions of local government bodies or institutions that represent the organizational form of **devolution**. These are *Zila* (District), *Upazila* (geographical sub divisions of district), and *Parishads* (geographical sub divisions of *upazila*). These are administrated by bureaucrats assigned by the Ministry of Public Administration. Besides, there are also local government institutions for urban areas like city corporations and municipalities. However, presently, elected local government bodies exist only at the Union and Municipal (Paurashava and City Corporations) levels that have been constituted through elections. Therefore Khulna City Corporation represents the organizational form of devolution for delivering services to city dwellers.

4.2 Functions of Khulna City Corporation

City Corporations are empowered to perform a variety of socio-economic and civic functions as described above. Khulna city Corporation is providing services to citizen through thirteen service departments. Those are Engineering, Electricity, Transport, Treasury, Health, Conservancy, Bazar, Tax Impose, Tax Collection, License (Trade), License (Transport), Estate, Education and Culture department. Functions of City Corporation are described in Local Government (City Corporation) Act 2009. The activities related to urban development can be referred through the following box.

Box 4.1: Responsibility and Urban Development Function of Khulna City Corporation According to Chapter 6 of Local Government (City Corporation) Act, 2009

Responsibility and Function of KCC: Section 41	
Based on the available fund KCC perform the following responsibility and function:	
Public Health	**Water supply and drainage**
• Responsibility for sanitation • Insanitary buildings • Removal, collection and disposal of refuse • Birth, death and marriages • Infectious diseases • Health and maternity centre • Promotion of public health • Hospital and dispensaries • Medical aid and relief and medical education	• Water supply • Private source of water supply • Drainage • Drainage schemes • Bathing and washing places • Dhobi ghats and washermen • Public water courses • Public ferries • Public fisheries
Articles of food and drink	**Public safety**
• By-laws for articles of food and drinks • Milk supply • Public markets • Private markets • Slaughter house	• Fire fighting • Civil defense • Foods • Famine • Dangerous and offensive articles and trades • Burial and burning places

Streets		Trees, parks, gardens and forests
- Public streets - Streets - General provision about streets - Encroachments - Street lighting - Street watering - Traffic control - Public vehicles		- Arboriculture - Gardens - Open spaces - Forests - Nuisances pertaining to trees and plantations - Tanks and low-lying area

Town planning and Building Control	Development
- Master plan - Site development schemes - Regulation of buildings	- Development plans - Community development projects - Commercial schemes

Annual administrative report of corporation: Section 43

Preparation of administrative report on activities of the municipality according to government determined form and method and publish it.

Publishing Citizen Charter: Section 44

Prepare "Citizen Charter" following the guideline provided by government.

Can change the guideline but inform the government about this change or elaboration for concern.

Following issues should be included in issuing citizen charter related rules:

- True and clear details of every services of municipality.
- Fees of services provided by municipality.
- Qualification and process to claim and receive services.
- Defined timeline to provide services.
- Citizen's responsibility regarding services.
- Assurance to provide services.
- Solution to complaints regarding service providing and
- Punishment to break commitment of the charter.

Use of advance Information Technology: Section 46

Ensure use of advanced technology within prescribed timeline.

Inform citizens regarding modern services described in citizen charter along with all government services using advanced information technology.

This study develops a matrix to identify urban development functions and projects performed by KCC through KII. It has been observed that the major challenges (table 4.1) for implementing the projects are encountered with the contradiction with the planning proposals of KDA. As KDA is the delegated planning organization for Khulna city.

Table 4.1: Matrix for checking urban development functions and projects performed by KCC

Urban development functions in City Corporation Act, 2009	Actually performed	Undertaken projects (2010-2016)	Funding organization	Challenges to implement urban development functions & projects
Public Health	All are done by KCC	Urban Primary Health Care Services Delivery Project (UPHCSDP)	ADB, DFID, UNFPI	No Challenge
Water Supply & Drainage	Totally performed by KWASA			
Articles of food and drink	All are done by KCC	Food Safety Project (2012-2015)	UN, FAO Netherland	Insufficient money to run the service
Town planning	Building Approval if above 6 storied building	City Region Development Project	(GoB, ADB, KFW)	Dependency on KDA for Plan Approval
Building Control	Building Approval if above 6 storied building	Installation of LED bulb to reduce Electric Consumption in Street Lighting System (GoB)		As above
Streets	Right	Main Road, Footpath extension and development in Khulna city	GoB	As above
Trees, parks, gardens and forests	Right	Hadis Park and adjacent pond	GoB	As above
Development	Right	Procurement of equipment for Solid Waste Management and Installation of Asfault Plant	GoB	As above

The above mentioned challenge is inevitable due to the lack of coordination among KDA and KCC. The issue of coordination among public authorities and financial integrity arise on that time when the physical infrastructure development project is implemented by one public authority but the assistance of multiple public authorities is essential due to dependency with each other. The issue of accountability can be also referred here as a major challenge. These two organizations are independent as per their form of decentralization. Therefore poor implementation of physical infrastructure development projects is a perennial problem for Khulna city for which city dwellers fail to get the benefits of government's spending in many cases. In addition, the existing laws fail to specify relationship among these public authorities to ensure administrative accountability. The following example best explains the situation.

Box 4.2: Problems of administrative accountability

> *A conflict has been arisen between KCC and Khulna Development Authority (KDA) where KCC threats KDA not to implement development activities in case of those areas where KDA earns profit but KCC bears cost for maintaining development activities. KCC demands that Sonadanga bus stand , Khulna New Market must be transferred to KCC in accordance with the practice followed by other City Corporation areas of Bangladesh.KCC also says that some residential areas like Nirala or Sonadanga, there is no dustbin where the city dwellers to put their daily wastes. And, it is the fault of KDA for not consultation with KCC during the time of constructing residential areas. (The Daily Purbanchal, 11/07/12).*

4.3 Performance evaluation of City Corporation in delivering services

This section presents the results of the household questionnaire survey in which 168 households participated along with the findings of KII and FGD. Household questionnaire survey touched upon the following three thematic areas: citizen access to services; citizen participation in service implementation, and maintenance; and citizen satisfaction towards city corporation services. Each of these three thematic areas was examined for four different sectors: road services, waste collection and removal, drains, sanitation and sewerage services, health services and local governance, with results summarized below.

4.3.1 Road construction and maintenance services of Khulna City Corporation

Table 4.2 provides an overview of road construction and maintenance services of Khulna City Corporation. It explores road connectivity, distance of nearest asphalted road, new road construction and old road repairs. In addition, it also identifies community participation in road construction and maintenance services of KCC. Table 4.2 reveals that a large proportion of the households (81%) are connected with other parts of the village/city through asphalted road. The remaining 19% households are also connected by the brick and cement built roads. Although most of households (90%) live near the asphalted road; but 5% households live slightly far from the asphalted road. The nearest distance of the asphalted road from these households is more than 10 meters. Most of the respondents (74.4%) did not find any new road construction activities of KCC in the past two years in their neighborhoods. A large proportion of the respondents (73.2%) revealed that no old roads were repaired over the past two years. Khulna City Corporation did not allow any community participation in road construction and maintenance services as almost 95% respondents never participated in the process of constructing or maintaining local roads. Only 5.4% respondents expressed their participation in the road construction process. Indeed, these respondents participated voluntarily in the road construction process in their neighborhoods. They are all self-motivated people who steer the process of constructing new roads or repairing old roads by overseeing KCC's road construction activities.

Table 4.3 reveals how community participates and takes necessary steps in maintaining local roads in different neighborhoods of Khulna city. It shows that KCC is the responsible authority for road maintenance in different neighborhoods of Khulna city. But, the local residents said KCC doesn't have any plan for road maintenance. Therefore, there is no specific

maintenance company responsible for local road work in different neighborhoods of Khulna city. The local residents often submit requests to the ward councilor for constructing new roads or repairing old roads. As shown table 4.3, most of respondents expressed they placed their requests of repairing roads to the ward-councilor, whereas 10% respondents requested local political leaders to take actions of repairing roads. There is no system of registering formal complaints for road maintenance services as more than 95% respondents agree that informal negotiations with ward councilors or local political are the major means to get services. More than 50% respondents expressed that KCC took 3-6 months to take actions. A large proportion of the respondents (53%) expressed that they often experienced the incidence of water logging in their neighborhoods in the rainy season. About 50% respondents revealed that KCC was not spontaneous to take actions to remove water logging. The residents need to inform ward councilor or local political leaders in order to take actions.

Table 4.2: Community participation in the road construction services of KCC

| Type of the road that connects household with other parts of the village/city		
Types of roads	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Asphalt	136	81.0
Brick	29	17.3
Cement	3	1.8
Total	168	100.0
Distance of the nearest asphalted road		
Distance (in metres)	**Frequency**	**Percent**
1-5	151	90
6-10	9	5
11-15	3	2
16 and above	5	3
Total	168	100
Construction of new roads during the past two years		
Construction of new roads	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Yes	43	25.6
No	125	74.4
Total	168	100.0
Repaired of old roads during the past year		
Repaired of old roads	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Yes	45	26.8
No	123	73.2
Total	168	100.0
Involvement of community to the construction or maintenance of the local road		
Community involvement	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Yes	9	5.4
No	159	94.6
Total	168	100.0
Type of the involvement to the community		
Type of the involvement	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Voluntary participation to oversee community activities	9	100
How are you selected?		
Selected by whom	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Self-interest/Self-motivation	9	100

Source: Field survey, 2016

Table 4.3: Community participation in the road maintenance services of KCC

Who maintains the roads in your neighborhoods?

Actors in road maintenance	Frequency	Percent
City Corporation	167	99.4
Local area committee	1	0.6
Total	168	100.0

If any repair is required, where do you go?

Where a people go if any repair is required	Frequency	Percent
Councilor office	158	94.0
Local political leader	10	6.0
Total	168	100.0

Type of complaints registered by respondents

Type of complaints	Frequency	Percent
Register formal complaints	7	4.2
Inform informally	161	95.8
Total	168	100.0

How quickly did the corporation respond?

Quickness of the responses	Frequency	Percent
Within a month	57	33.9
3-6 months	97	57.7
more than 6 months	14	8.3
Total	168	100.0

Is there incidence of waterlogging or deterioration of the local roads during heavy rains?

Incidence of waterlogging	Frequency	Percent
Yes	89	53.0
No	79	47.0
Total	168	100.0

Initiatives taken spontaneously by city corporation

Initiatives taken spontaneously by city corporation	Frequency	Percent
Yes	45	26.8
No	73	43.5
Don't know	50	29.8
Total	168	100

If answer is no, what initiatives did you take?

Informal initiatives taken by the house owner	Frequency	Percent
Inform councilor	53	31.5
Inform local political leader	7	4.2
Landowners take initiatives	8	4.8
No initiatives taken	100	59.5
Total	168	100.0

Source: Field survey, 2016

Figure 4.1 reveals extent of community satisfaction with local road services of KCC. A large proportion of the respondents (52%) expressed their dissatisfaction with KCC in the case of road fixing. Similarly, most of the respondents (64%) expressed their dissatisfaction with cleanliness of local roads in their neighborhoods. More than 50% respondents showed their dissatisfaction with KCC responsiveness to react on complaints that was received from local residents. Also a large number of citizens also expressed dissatisfaction with the role that KCC played during rainy season. Reasons include that the local authority's failure to do anything for solving water logging problem.

Figure 4.1: Community satisfaction with local road services of KCC

Source: Field survey, 2016

4.3.2 Solid waste and drainage services of Khulna City Corporation

Table 4.3 provides an overview of solid waste services of Khulna City Corporation. It explores types of waste collection system, actors in collection system and effectiveness of garbage collection in meeting family needs. It reveals that most of households in the KCC area (about 84%) can have door to door collection system where garbage carts pick wastes from different neighborhoods. The remaining 16% households do not have this door to door collection service. These households bring their refuse to nearby communal bins/container located in the street. Although these households can dump their refuse nearby their houses, but about 4% households have to travel far from their house to dump their daily wastes. The following table also reveals that most of residents (70%) use solid waste management services of KCC, whereas 23% of total households use services of other actors such as NGOs and local housing societies. The remaining 7% households manage their wastes by their own initiatives. Most of the residents (74.4%) state that waste is collected once every 2-3 days; but waste is collected one time per day from 18% residences. Nearly 90% residents feel that the current frequency of waste collection does not meet their needs. They state the frequency of waste collection insufficient, as containers are often overflowing, and there is a lot of rubbish around the containers. The residents also consider the large waste items leave next to containers to be a serious problem.

Table 4.3: Solid waste management service of KCC

Which of the following waste collection services does your household use?		
Waste collection services	Frequency	Percent
Garbage cart picks up garbage	141	83.9
Garbage dumpster near home	21	12.5
Garbage dumpster far from home	6	3.6
Total	168	100.0
Who does waste collection in your neighborhoods?		
Waste collectors	Frequency	Percent
NGO	14	8.3
Local area management	23	13.7
Citizens	13	7.7
City Corporation	118	70.2
Total	168	100.0

How is the garbage collection schedule?		
Schedule of the garbage collection	**Frequency**	**Percent**
2 or more times per day	0	0.0
One time per day	30	17.9
Once every 2–3 days	125	74.4
Once a week	5	3.0
Once a month	1	0.6
Don't know	7	4.2
Total	168	100.0
Does this schedule respond to your family's needs?		
Schedules respond to family's needs	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Yes	150	89.3
No	18	10.7
Total	168	100.0
Does the garbage collection accord with the schedule?		
Garbage collection accord with the schedule	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Regular	30	17.9
Sometimes interrupted	138	82.1
Total	168	100

Source: Field survey, 2016

Table 4.4 identifies the extent of community participation in the improvement of drainage services in different neighborhood. Most of the respondents (93%) confirm that their houses are connected with community drains. The current frequency of cleaning drains is unsatisfactory as the residents confirm that KCC did not clean community drains in a week. Many residents state that KCC often clean community drains once in a month, which is insufficient, as drains are often overflowing, and there is a lot of solid wastes in the community drains. These residents also consider the large waste items residents throw into the drains to be a serious problem, which creates water logging in the neighborhoods. Most of the respondents confirm that they did not register any formal complaints, but they informed ward-councilor and city corporation officials informally. A large number of the respondents believe that informal process is more effective than formal one. Some respondents state that there is no formal system of registering complaints. About 10% residents consider local political leaders as one of the major actor who usually steer KCC to take actions in this matter. The house owner association in some neighborhood negotiates with KCC or ward councilor to take actions. Most of the residents (82%) state that KCC often takes 3-6 months to execute actions, but 14% residents said that local authority needs a month to take actions when residents or house owner association informed ward commission or KCC officials in order to clean drains.

Table 4.4: Community participation in the improvement of drainage service of KCC

Are your house connected with drainage?		
House connected with drainage	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Yes	156	92.9
No	12	7.1
Total	168	100.0
What is the frequency of cleaning of the drains in your neighborhood?		
Frequency of cleaning drains	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Weekly	0	0
Bimonthly	33	19.6
Once a month	88	52.4
Less than once a month	39	23.2
Never cleaned	8	4.8
Total	168	100.0

Have you registered any complaints regarding cleaning the drains?

Registered complaints regarding cleaning the drains	Frequency	Percent
Yes	30	17.9
No	138	82.1
Total	168	100.0

If yes, where did you register formal complaints?

Place of the register complaints	Frequency	Percent
Local councilor office	28	16.7
City Corporation Office	2	1.2
No formal complaints made	138	82.1
Total	168	100

Do you inform or press this issue informally?

Complaints informally	Frequency	Percent
Yes	134	79.76
No	34	20.24
Total	168	100

Why don't you register formal complaints?

Reason behind informal complaints	Frequency	Percent
Informal process is more effective than formal one	91	54.2
No formal complaint registration process existed	13	7.7
Local ruling party leader takes action in this matter	10	6.0
Commission always takes actions in this matter	17	10.1
Our house owner association inform this to KCC/ward councilor	11	6.5
No answer	26	15.5
Total	168	100

How many days did City Corporation need to take actions?

Days needed to the take action by city corporation	Frequency	Percent
A week	6	3.7
A month	24	14.3
3-6 months	138	82
Total	168	100

Source: Field survey, 2016

Figure 4.2 reveals extent of community satisfaction with solid waste and drainage services of KCC. Most of the respondents (81%) express their satisfaction with distance of collection sites from their homes as they found temporary dumping or secondary collection to dump their household wastes. However, many users show dissatisfaction with other services of solid waste management and drainage services of KCC including number of dumpsters (1.83 out of 4); maintenance of solid wastes and drains in the rainy season (1.85); regularity of dumping public garbage dumpsters (1.04); Location where garbage is collected from garbage carts/dumpsters (1.86); and regular maintenance of drains (1.84). The residents expressed their dissatisfaction with the number of garbage dumpsters as waste is collected once a week from these sites. For the size of the population and the volume of waste, the residents consider these sites insufficient. The result is overflowing containers surrounded by waste and unpleasant odors. While the current frequency of waste collection from temporary dumping sites is unsatisfactory to the residents of Khulna city, they confirm that service providers follow the timetable for waste collection. Most participants mention there are dump sites close to their apartment buildings or houses which create odors and also causes health problems. Local residents feel that the current frequency of cleaning community drains does not meet their needs. They consider the cleaning community drains insufficient in the rainy season which causes water logging in different parts of Khulna city.

**Figure 4.2: Community satisfaction with solid waste and drainage services of KCC**

Source: Field survey, 2016

4.3.3 Sanitation, health services of Khulna City Corporation

The public sewerage service is not available in Khulna city. All the households surveyed in this research built their own private septic tank for managing fecal sludge. Therefore, many users express their dissatisfaction with KCC's sanitation services as it does not have any initiative to clean their septic tank. KCC provides primary health services to its residents by building partnership with NGOs. Many residents of different neighborhoods often visit the health clinics and these residents (70.8%) express their dissatisfaction with the services of health clinics. Previously, KCC provided water supply service to its residents, but government took this responsibility from KCC and devolved a new organization, KWASA in order to supply water to the residents of Khulna city. Most of the residents state that they are satisfied with water supply services; but 35.2% residents showed their dissatisfaction with this service.

Figure 4.3: Community satisfaction with some public services

Source: Field survey, 2016

Table 4.5 explores whether KCC services such as local roads, solid waste management, sanitation, community drains, water supply and health services had been improved in past three years or not. Less than 10% respondents state that KCC services had been improved to a large extent; but a large number of residents (more than 60%) did not find any change in KCC services in the past 3 years. Some respondents (nearly 20%) believe that services like local road construction and maintenance, solid waste management and water supply had a small improvement.

Table 4.5: Level of improvement of public services in the past three years

Improvement of public services	To large extent		To small extent		No change		Worse		Don't know	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Local roads	10	5.95	35	20.8	107	63.7	16	9.5	0	0.00
Solid waste collection	5	2.98	32	19.0	106	63.1	25	14.9	10	5.95
Neighborhood drains	16	9.52	29	17.3	121	72.0	2	1.2	0	0.00
Sanitation	13	7.74	26	15.5	114	67.9	15	8.9	0	0.00
Water supply	6	3.57	33	19.6	121	72.0	8	4.8	2	1.19
Health Clinics of KCC	15	8.93	22	13.1	85	50.6	23	13.7	23	13.69

Source: Field survey, 2016

4.3.4 Governance of City Corporation

Decisions on various City Corporation's urban development functions, such as planning for infrastructure facilities, regular monitoring of the services, approval of municipal budget, etc., are taken in the meetings of the City Corporation. Meetings are held periodically during which resolutions are passed on the basis of voting. According to City Corporation Ordinance, 2009 participation in municipal meetings is not restricted to any category of person and may include the elected, nominated and ex-officio members, and other appointed authorities/officers associated with the local government. Besides, every meeting is open to the public. However, Khulna City Corporation did not allow its citizens to take part in the local government events such as council meetings, public hearing, town level coordination meetings and municipal assembly. As shown in table 4.6, only 10% of total respondents attended public hearings of municipal budget, but they confirm that the public hearing meetings were not participatory and city residents can only get information about municipal budget and other matters. As local residents did not have any influence in decision making process of budget preparation and planning of infrastructure, they were reluctant to attend in public hearings of City Corporation. Due to same reason, the participation of local residents in other local government events such municipal assembly, ward and town level coordination meetings are low. They state that the elected members of City Corporation, who are representatives of the citizens in the local government, are important actors involved in the decision-making process on behalf of them.

Table 4.6: Community experience about local government events

Local government events	Participation		Very useful		Useful to some extent		Not useful		Don't know	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Public meetings of the municipal budget	17	10.12	0	0	15	8.93	2	1.19	151	89.88
Public hearing other than municipal budget	3	1.79	0	0	1	0.60	2	1.19	165	98.21
Local council sessions	2	1.19	1	0.60	2	1.19	0	0	166	98.81
Ward level coordination meetings	29	17	19	11.3	8	4.76	2	1.19	139	82.74
Town level coordination meeting	1	0.60	0	0	1	0.6	0	0	167	99.0
Municipal assembly	1	0.6	0	0	1	0.6	0	0	167	99.0

Source: Field survey, 2016

Figure 4.4 shows community satisfaction with different local government events. Many residents confirm that City Corporation elections are free and fair (3.6 out of 5). In addition, many respondents believe that they feel safe to live in their neighborhood. However, a large number of respondents state they are not satisfied with City Corporation, mainly because of failure to implement citizen's priorities. Similarly, many respondents state that they did not feel free to express their opinion and also they confirm that KCC did not have enough initiatives to protect vulnerable people from abuses. Along with, a large number of residents state that they are not conscious about their participation in local government events. Although many people are skeptical about City Corporation's willingness to promote citizen participation in local government events, but they confirm that Khulna City Corporation has a culture of acknowledging diversity.

Figure 4.4: Community satisfaction with local governance

Source: Field survey, 2016

Figure 4.5 explores the extent of citizen participation in local government decision making process. Most of the respondents confirm that City Corporation almost never consulted with them to include their priorities in the development of it. Many residents feel that the decisions of those in power at the City Corporation almost never reflect their priorities. A small number of residents state that local government consult with its residents in some areas and therefore decisions of City Corporation reflect citizen's priorities in some areas. Residents also confirm that the decisions of those in power at City Corporation are based on the interests of political parties rather than the interests of the population. However, the process of citizen participation can be explained through the following boxes.

Box 4.3: Recognition of any people's perceptions while designing the project

In KCC people's perception are taken via Councilor. As Councilor is the representative of the community/ward people, his decision became granted in KCC from project design to implementation and evaluation. He generally performs meeting in Ward Councilor Office with different stakeholders and identify the sectors for example which road is to constructed urgently etc. means assessment the needs of the ward people. For a large project KCC centrally arrange meeting with the different departmental head and project consultant e.g. CRDP, CDIA, UPHHDP etc. (Key Informant Interview, 14/07/16).

Box 4.4: Incorporating communities while implementing project

When the engineer and the contractor goes to the project area to provide the lay out or other purposes, the residents (from elite to general people) of the community for whom the project are called and the project brief discussed in front of them. The briefing includes the estimate of the project, type of project work and a sign is done in front of them. Councilor is also present there and the work will start under a ceremony through eating sweets or other foods. Mainly engineer has the power to monitor the project. The civil society members have only the access to learn about the project work, budget, how it will be done etc. from engineer. No activities are assigned to external organization or civil society organization for monitoring the project (Key Informant Interview, 14/07/16).

Figure 4.5: Citizen Participation in local government decision making process

Source: Field survey, 2016

Table 4.6 reveals evaluation of tax assessment process of Khulna City Corporation. It is found that most of the city dwellers (60.1%) express their dissatisfaction with tax assessment process of City Corporation. Two reasons of dissatisfaction were come out from the survey including: fixation of excess tax and tax assessment without citizen participation. Most of the city dwellers (95%) state that they are dissatisfied because of fixation of excess tax. As the residents in Khulna city feel they are the victims of tax assessment process of KCC, they contacted different actors of City Corporation such as ward councilors, mayor, and City Corporation officials. A large number of citizens contact (more than 20%) with ward councilors and City Corporation officials. Only 1% city dwellers often contact with mayor in order to ask for reducing their holding tax. But, only 38% participated in public hearings of tax assessment. Focus group discussion reveals the reason of less attendance in public hearing meetings. Citizen participation in public hearing and other policy making meetings is low because of citizens' skeptical attitudes about the effectiveness of their participation in these meetings. The house owners state that informal networks with local politician and ward councilors or paying some bribes to City Corporation are more effective modes of reducing tax rather participating in formal hearing system. Half of the respondents who participated in public hearings in past 3 or 4 years express their satisfaction about the public hearing process.

Table 4.6: Evaluation of tax-assessment process of KCC

| Are you satisfied with this assessment process?		
Satisfaction	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Yes	67	39.9
No	101	60.1
Total	168	100.0
If no, why are you dissatisfied with your tax assessment process?		
Dissatisfaction	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Excess tax fixed for your building	96	95.04
Tax assessment without your participation	5	4.95
Total	101	100
Do you contact anybody for reducing your holding tax?		
Contact anybody	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Local political leader	12	7.1
Ward Councilor	41	24.4
Mayor	2	1.2
City Corporation official	41	24.4
Don't contact	72	42.9
Total	168	100.0
Do you attend in public hearing regarding tax assessment?		
Attended in public hearings	**Frequency**	**Percent**
yes	63	37.5
no	105	62.5
Total	168	100
If yes, rank your experience: the public hearing was effective in considering citizen's views		
Rank of participants' experiences	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Satisfied	32	50.8
No change	13	20.6
Dissatisfied	18	28.6
Total	63	100.0

Source: Field survey, 2016

4.3.5 Socio-cultural factors for promoting accountability in KCC

The focus group discussions first reveal seven key realities that they perceived to have significance on their participation, namely: a) economic condition; b) awareness of the planning of infrastructure development and local governance process; c) effectiveness of communication strategies taken by the City Corporation; d) trust in City Corporation; e) sense of urgency (i.e. whether or not they were personally affected by the plan) and f) residents' informal network; and g) membership of residents in civil society organizations. Participants of household survey were asked to give their importance on these socio-cultural factors affecting their tendency to participate in the local governance process. Figure 4.6 reveals comparative importance of participants' realities perceived by the citizens. Citizens' attitude towards participation may be substantially affected by the level of trust they have on planning agencies seeking to engage them to participate (Swapan, 2014). This is found in the household survey as trust on municipality received the lowest rating of 1.55 out of 4. Most of participants (75% of total respondents) are reluctant to be involved in the local governance process because they believe their opinions were not considered at the decision making process of local government. FGD participants believe they cannot influence decision-making processes through participatory mechanisms. Their main, and often only, form of citizen participation is through elections. Citizen initiatives are often politicized, and as a result, individuals lose confidence in the process. Many do not believe government decisions reflect their priorities. The organizational respondents state that citizens do not believe decisions of those in power reflect citizens' priorities because citizens have greater expectations, government cannot respond to all citizens' requests and needs, there

is insufficient financial and political support from central government, and there are political instability and other obstructions to participation.

As discussed in the prior sections, citizen participation in local governance is quite minimal. Most of citizens participate at the local level through indirect mechanisms (89 percent), such as maintaining good network with ward councilors, local political leaders and City Corporation officials more often than through direct mechanisms, such as participation in public hearings, meetings and petitions. The findings of FGDs and key informant surveys also justify the households' survey findings. The FGDs reveal that the house owners maintained informal networks with local ward councilor in order to get their tasks done. In many cases, citizens without having personal connections sought help from middleman who already had an informal relationship with the City Corporation or was an employee of City Corporation. Financial transactions are common for utilizing this kind of indirect network. The house owners were also found to take help from local political representatives and relatives or neighbors. The FGDs also reveal that citizen participation in local decision making and policy making of City Corporation is weak because of citizens' skeptical attitudes about the effectiveness of participation and their limited knowledge of government processes. The residents' participation is limited largely because they feel that this participation would ultimately be ineffective in helping them influence local decision making. Similarly, the figure also shows that 61% participants of household survey agree that awareness of local governance can affect their tendency to participate in local government meetings and planning of infrastructure development. Sense of urgency is another socio-cultural factor that affect participants' tendency to participate in local governance process. About 60% participants believe that the residents became motivated to participate when they saw themselves as being potentially negatively affected by the decisions of local government. Many respondents (more than 25%) also perceived economic condition as one of the determinants of willingness to participate. Lower socio-economic status such as lower education level, lack of awareness of the planning process and rights and responsibilities, may also lead to inadequate perceptions and interests in participation. The FGDs also reveal this fact that socio-economic profile often affects their tendency to participate in decision making process.

Figure 4.6: Socio-cultural factors affecting their tendency to participate in local governance

Source: Field survey, 2016

Figure 4.7: Citizens' aspire to participate in KCC's infrastructure development planning

Source: Field survey, 2016

4.4 Conclusion

The above findings and discussions comprehensively explain why the level of community participation is low in Khulna City Corporation. The empirical study summarizes that individual's unwillingness to participate could result from individual's lack of awareness, discouraging perceptions about participation outcomes and most notably lack of institutionalization process in the planning system. Consequently, it results in a tendency to avoid participation. Therefore ensuring transparency and accountability through peoples participation has not been institutionalized in KCC. However there are some good practices that can be explained in the following box.

Box 4.5: Ensuring transparency and accountability of the projects of KCC

> *To ensure transparency and accountability 100 percent efforts come from KCC but for some corruption among the contractors and engineers it might become tough. But KCC still transparent and accountable. When people come to us to learn something about the project we help them to understand. And this is the process of transparency and accountability. We use signboard which can be used as a transparency tool as people know from that about the project. If the people or civil society faces any problem they come to us and meetings are arranged to answer their questions and try to solve their problems. This is one kind of method of ensuring transparency and accountability. (Key Informant Interview, 14/07/16).*

Therefore these practices need to be institutionalized in KCC. This suggests that there could be significant improvement in the extent and effectiveness of community participation by motivating the ward councilors to the need to be more critical of and accountable for their dealings with the community. KCC should also work in order to increase the level of awareness of the citizens. Citizens, on the other hand, need to hold community issues over individual backyard conflict. A genuine effort from both citizens and elected representatives should ensure an effective participatory decision to guide the development of the city in a more accountable way.

CHAPTER **05**
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF KHULNA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY'S URBAN DEVELOPMENT PLANNING FUNCTIONS

5.1 Introduction

Bangladesh has a multi-layer administrative system with the central government at the top. There are special development authorities in four divisional headquarters urban centers out of six divisions. The jurisdiction of these authorities extends beyond their respective city corporation boundaries. Officially, they are autonomous agencies created on the basis of their respective acts/ordinances. These organizations are Rajdhani Unnayan Kartripakkha (Capital Development Authority) for Dhaka City, Chittagong Development Authority for Chtittagong City, Khulna Development Authority for Khulna City and Rajshahi development Authority for Rajshahi City. Therefore these organizations represent the **delegated** form of organizational structure of decentralization process. These authorities are charged with three major responsibilities- development, development control and planning. Despite their official autonomous status these agencies are actually, controlled by the Ministry of Housing and Public Works. All top officials of these authorities are appointed by the government. In this backdrop Khulna Development Authority (KDA) is a semi-autonomous organization established on 21 January of 1961. KDA was created by the then East Pakistan Govt. by an ordinance called 'The Khulna Development Authority Ordinance, 1961'. Therefore in this research the performance of KDA will be evaluated to identify the accountability issues in their different urban development activities.

5.2 Functions of Khulna Development Authority

The main functions of KDA are (i) to prepare the master plan of the city and its vicinity; (ii) to develop the city following the master plan; and (iii) to control the development. At present, it has a jurisdiction area of 824.76 sq km.

Box 5.1: Responsibility and Urban Development Function of Khulna Development Authority According to Chapter IV of Khulna Development Authority Ordinance, 1961

Preparation of Master Plan (Section 22)
- Preparation and submission of Master Plan to the Government for approval;
- Prepare maps in descriptive matter as necessary to illustrate the proposals of master plan.

Publication of Master Plan (Section 23)
- After the government approval the authority announce the approval information by notification and publish such notification;
- Can any time, amend or alter any specific provision of the Master Plan.

Permission for use of land contrary to the Master Plan (Section 24)
- Approval of building plans within Khulna Master Plan area;
- If any person desires to use any land for any purpose other than that laid down in the Master Plan approved under section 23, he may apply in writing to the Chairman for permission so to do;
- If chairman refuse to give permission the people can appeal against such refusal within sixty days;
- The decision of the Authority on any appeal under sub-section (2) shall be final.

Controlled Area (Section 26)
- By notification, declare any area included in the Master Plan to be a controlled area.

Declaration of use area and location thereof (Section 27)

Preparation of Development Programmes (Section 28)
- After publication of the Master Plan the authority is responsible for preparation, and submission of Five Year Programmes of development and improvement of the areas covered by the Master Plan, to the Government

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Preparation and submission of specific schemes to Government (Section 29)
- After approval of the Programmes by the Government, with or without any modification, the Authority prepare and submit to the Government specific schemes on the basis of the Programme.
- Provided that the Authority may, without need for further approval by the Government, under intimation to the Government, undertake execution of any scheme already approved by it in the Programmes.

Matters to be provided for improvement scheme (Section 30)
- The acquisition by the Authority of any land, in the area comprised in the scheme;
- The laying out or relaying out of the land in the said area;
- Such demolition, alternation or reconstruction of buildings situated on land which it is proposed to acquire in the said area, as the Authority may think necessary;
- The laying out or alternation of streets (including bridges, causeways and culverts);
- The levelling, paving, metalling, flagging, channelling, sewering and draining of the said streets and the provisions therein of water, lighting and other sanitary conveniences ordinarily provided in a Municipality;
- The raising, lowering or levelling of any land in the area comprised in the scheme;
- The formation, retention or enlargement of open spaces;
- The augmentation of the present water supply, or any other scheme for the improvement of the water supply;
- The making of a drainage and sewerage scheme including outfall works; and
- Any other matters consistent with this Ordinance which the Authority may think fit.

Discontinuance of use of land and alteration or removal of building (Section 31)
For interest of public and for proper planning authority can:
- Discontinue any use of land or impose conditions on the continuance thereof;
- Remove, alter any building, works or factory.

Re-housing of persons displaced by improvement schemes (Section 32)
Frame schemes for the construction, maintenance and management of dwellings and shops which will be providing to the displaced people.

Preparation, publications and transmission of notice as to improvement scheme and supply of documents to applicants (Section 33)

Transmission to Authority of representation by Corporation (Section 34)

Furnishing list of persons and copy of, or extract from assessment list (Section 35)

Abandonment of improvement scheme, or application to Government to sanction it (Section 36)

Power to sanction or reject improvement scheme (Section 37)

Notification of sanction to improvement scheme (Section 38

Transfer to Authority for purposes of improvement schemes of building or land vested (Section 41)

Taking over of laid out or altered streets by Corporation (Section 42)

Transfer of any schemes or property of Government or local authority to the Authority (Section 43)

Power to make survey or contribute towards their cost (Section 44)

This study develops a matrix to identify urban development functions and projects performed by KDA through KII. It has been observed that the major challenges (table 5.1) for implementing the projects are encountered with the lack of people's participation.

Table 5.1: Matrix for checking urban development functions and projects performed by KDA

Urban Development According to Chapter IV of KDA ordinance, 1961	Actually performed & how do they perform their duties & how do you follow Master Plan while performing functions	Consider People's participation	How do you consider?	Challenges to perform the functions
Master Plan	Yes. For performing every day's function and taking any project KDA is bound to follow master plan.	Yes	Informing, consultation and public hearing. KDA if the information provided by the participant is reasonable they consider it.	Acquisition of land for development
Permission for use of land contrary to the Master Plan	Yes. Apply in writing to the Chairman for permission to do so. If needed chairman can go to visit the site. If chairman refuse to give permission client can within sixty days of the Chairman's refusal, appeal to the Authority against such refusal.	No	No need to consider	People are not aware about the land use provision in the master plan and reasoning of such provision

Controlled Area	Authority may declare any area included in the Master Plan to be a controlled area	No	No need to consider	Haphazard growth of the city without following master plan
Declaration of use are a and location	Provide written notice to the person for purpose of hearing and declare any area included in the Master Plan to be a use area.	Yes	Informing	
Preparation of Development Programmes	Yes. The project section of KDA prepare DPP based on master plan and DAP, then they send it to ministry for further process	No	As the plan was prepared with collaboration of community, no need for further participation	
Preparation and submission of specific schemes to Government	After the approval of DPP by the government project section of KDA prepare specific schemes and submit it to the government. KDA execute the urgent public need schemes and schemes not exceeded taka one lac under the approved DPP.	Yes	Urgent public need schemes are identified with collaboration of people.	Prioritize the development schemes
Matters to be provided for improvement scheme	The necessary matters are provided properly for improvement scheme.	No	Expert led process	Collecting all information is actually difficult

The above mentioned challenge is inevitable due to the lack of people's participation mechanism in urban development functions of KDA. A look into the planning processes adopted by KDA confirms that it upholds the core principles of community involvement. Relevant planning documents clearly outline the requirement of three-tier participation of the public for decision-making. It emphasized participation in demand mediation, formulating planning standards and in designing development. However, it is reported that only selected representatives from relevant public departments, professional groups, civil society organizations, business groups, media, political leaders and academics were consulted to determine the preliminary design of plan preparation process.

The stated aim of the consultation meetings was to prepare an account of infrastructure problems faced in the locality and their causes in order to document suggestions or "stakeholders' wish list" to be reflected in the draft layout plan. The draft plan based on the consultative meetings was then displayed to a selected group of people for feedback. Restriction of the consultation to selected stakeholders carries a substantial risk of allowing in bias that may suit vested interests of the selected group members. The process of people's participation can be explained through the following box.

Box 5.2: Process of People's Participation in the Plan Preparation Stage of KDA

The people's perceptions are taken from plan preparation to implementation stages. People's perceptions are taken during the preparation of database through the initial survey in the area that to be planned. During the preparation of the final plan KDA arrange a meeting with the community people and inform about the plan. If the community people have any opposition against the prepared plan KDA try to solve this problem. But problem is that, the people who attend in this meeting actually don't have adequate knowledge about the planning. After preparing final plan the plan is presented to the civil society, journalist and representative from KCC and if they give any comment for alteration of the plan, it is considered. Finally, before gazetting the plan there is a provision for public hearing (Key Informant Interview, 21/07/16).

5.3 Performance evaluation of KDA in delivering services

This section presents the results of the household questionnaire survey in which 168 households participated along with the findings of KII and FGD. Household questionnaire survey touched upon the following three thematic areas: planning permission from KDA; citizen participation in plan preparation and implementation; and plot distribution process of KDA. Each of these three thematic areas was examined in this research with the results summarized below.

### 5.3.1 Planning Permission for Buildings

Before constructing any building a plot owner needs to apply for a land use clearance to check its conformity with land use proposals of the master plans. If the applied land use confirms the master plan's proposal, the plot owners gets the No Objection Certification (NOC) of land use clearance and apply for the approval of the building plans for detail architectural drawing of the site and building. KDA is the legitimate public institution issuing approval of building plans within its jurisdiction. Before any sort of construction a land owner need to take the 'land use clearance' and 'approved building plan' from KDA.

Figure 5.1: NOC for Land Use Clearance

From the aforementioned process it can be observed that the plot owners can apply for the No Objection Certification (NOC) of land use clearance and may apply for the approval of the building plans. However the findings from questionnaire survey reveal that out of 168 households not a single household directly applied for the plan permission. Rather they are depending on architect or architectural firm (figure 5.2) or they are getting it through commissioning KDA employees (figure 5.3). Therefore the problem of corruption is persistent in the plan approval process. In KDA there is no single unit to support the land owners for preparing the supportive documents for issuing No Objection Certification (NOC) of land use clearance. In addition there is no grievance redress mechanism in place to accommodate the complaints from the land owner. Hence the planning permission process in not accountable.

Figure 5.2: How do you get planning permission for your building?

Source: Field survey, 2016

**Figure 5.3: Payment of speed money for getting planning permission for your building**

Source: Field survey, 2016

It has been observed that 86.3 percent of the respondents are paying speed money (figure 5.3) to KDA officials, architectural firm or other agents outside of KDA. Among these informal channels KDA officials (81.4%) are getting mostly this type of speed money (figure 5.4). This fact can be elaborated by narrating a comment from one of the participant of focus groups discussion in the following box.

Box 5.3: Payment of speed money for getting planning permission

I am planning to construct my building since 2014 but I had no idea whom to consult for getting plan approval of my building. I was assisted by my architect for getting permission from KDA to get No Objection Certification (NOC) of land use clearance and the approval of the building plans. He charged me additional 5000 tk for such approval. Question him about this additional charge he told me that he had to pay KDA officials for getting the permission and getting it in a shorter period of time. I asked him about any probable remedy from this problem and he told me it will just make the process longer and uncertain (Focus Group Discussion, 22/07/16).

Figure 5.4: Who took speed money for planning permission?

- 17.9
- 0.7
- 81.4
- KDA official
- Architectural firm
- Agent outside KDA

Source: Field survey, 2016

The aforementioned scenario has a direct impact on citizen's aspiration to make KDA more accountable. This process of speed money is hindering their voice to claim their legitimate right. The data from the questionnaire survey reveals that almost two-third of the respondents (figure 5.5) do not visit KDA office to know the status of planning permission of their building.

Figure 5.5: Visit KDA office to know status of planning permission of your building

- 36.9
- 63.1
- Yes
- No

Source: Field survey, 2016

This process is finally resulting to no complaints from the households. As it has been observed that fear of not getting permission (25.64%), no trust on KDA's complaint system (25.64%), no knowledge about complaint system (12.82%) and having good informal network with KDA officials are the main reasons behind no complaints registration.

Figure 5.6: Reasons behind no complaints registration

Source: Field survey, 2016

As per the section 23 of Khulna Development Authority ordinance, 1961, KDA provides feedback to the clients about their building plan permission. It has been observed that in most cases violation of setback rule is a common feedback from KDA (35.5%). Other feedbacks include adequacy of road width, violation of master plan proposals, fault in building design, problems of land entitlement and easement deed (figure 5.7).

**Figure 5.7: Feedback from KDA in the case of planning permission**

Source: Field survey, 2016

These types of feedback without having any grievance redress mechanism causing another layer of corruption. As the complaint system is not accountable and the citizens are often using informal channels to resolve these feedbacks (figure 5.8). It has been observed that during the KII that the complaint system is not accountable and often the feedbacks are directly provided by the chairman himself. The following box portrays this situation.

Box 5.4: Existence of independent complaints office within KDA

In ground floor there is a box for putting complaints. Besides this, in desk pass complaints are taken in written form. Then it is passed to the chairman, after that it goes to the relevant department. Then it can be verified by the respective department. Finally the claimant gets the solution from the chairman. In addition, there is a signboard in the ground floor about how public can make complaints to the KDA. There is no program outside KDA to disseminate these issues among the residents. Sometimes they are not aware of the master plan rules. So some claims are not appropriate and quite impossible for giving solutions in those cases (Key Informant Interview, 21/07/16).

Figure 5.8: Ways of managing the feedback from KDA regarding building permission

Source: Field survey, 2016

The aforementioned issues have direct impact on the satisfaction index (figure 5.9) of the residents regarding the planning permission process and resulting through the violation of setback (table 5.2) in the individual household level while they are constructing their buildings.

Figure 5.9: Satisfaction of the residents regarding building permission

Source: Field survey, 2016

Table 5.2: Violation of setback

Plot size (in square feet)	Frequency of buildings	Percentages of the violated buildings		
		Front side setback rules	Back side setback rules	Rear side of the building
Less than 656	20	100%	100%	98%
657- 986	95	95%	85%	82%
987-1640	28	71%	73%	77%
1641 and above	25	72%	78%	79%
Total	168	88%	84%	83%

Source: Field survey, 2016

It has been observed that though the building inspector or authorized section often visits the site of construction but again the corrupted system is encouraging the violation of setback. It has been also observed that no awareness campaign has not been performed by KDA regarding the importance of setback rules in the last five years. Therefore citizens are unaware of that issue from the self-actualization perspective and violating the rules by using different form of corruptions.

5.3.2 KDA's Plot Distribution Services
Apart from the development control mechanism KDA is also developing land for delivering serviced plot for the residents. However it has been observed during the questionnaire survey that almost 40% of the respondents have never applied for KDA developed plots (table 5.3). One major cause of such denial is the lack of trustworthiness with KDA regarding its plot distribution system as 31.8 % of them have no trust in KDA's plot distribution system (table 5.3). It has also been observed that citizens who are getting the plots are selling it in substantial number (35.7%). Therefore, it can be concluded that the plot distribution mechanism is not demand-driven. This situation can be explained better through the following box.

Box 5.5: Lack of accountability in KDA's plot distribution services

KDA has recently launched the plot distribution process in Mayuri residential area project. The project was designed for 653 plots. However among these 15% were reserved for the Minister, who will distribute these plots by his own without any accountable measure. Therefore it creates frustration among the citizens who are really in need of these plots. In addition to that we have not seen any single land development projects by KDA for housing the urban poor. Therefore we sometime feel that KDA is acting as a real estate developer using the public money and working for the social (Focus Group Discussion, 22/07/16).

**Table 5.3: Evaluation of KDA's plot distribution services**

Have you ever applied for KDA's plots

Have you ever applied for KDA's plots	Frequency	Percent
Yes	102	60.7
No	66	39.3
Total	168	100

If answer no, why didn't apply for plot?

Reason behind not applying for plot	Frequency	Percent
High land price	12	18.2
Unavailability of money	7	10.6
Lower chance of getting plots in lottery system	9	13.6
No trust in KDA's plot distribution system	21	31.8
Political influence in plot distribution	13	19.7
Other	4	6.1
Total	66	100.0

Have you got KDA's residential or commercial plot?

Got KDA's plots	Frequency	Percent
Yes	56	33.33
No	112	66.67
Total	168	100

Where did you get residential or commercial plot?

Location of getting commercial or residential plot	Frequency	Percent
Nirala	14	25.0
Sonadanga	14	25.0
Mujgunni	16	28.6
Sonadanga bypass road	4	7.1
Muyuri project	5	8.9
Others	3	5.4
Total	56	100

How did you get residential plot?

Ways of getting residential plot	Frequency	Percent
Quota	14	25
Lottery method	6	10.7
Buying from primary owner	36	64.3
Total	56	100.0

Did you have any residential unit when you applied for residential plot?

Having residential unit when you applied for residential plot	Frequency	Percent
Yes	69	67.6
No	33	32.4
Total	102	100.0

What did you do after getting plot?

Purpose of using plot	Frequency	Percent
Building house or commercial unit	32	57.1

Sale the plot	20	35.7
Renting the plot	4	7.1
Leasing	0	0.0
Total	56	100.0
Are you satisfied land transfer process of KDA?		
Satisfaction level with land transfer process of KDA	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Yes	13	23.2
No	43	76.8
Total	56	100
Did KDA official ask for money while transferring land?		
Any speed money for transferring plots	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Yes	31	55.4
No	25	44.6
Total	56	100.0

Source: Field survey, 2016

The aforementioned scenario is affecting residents' satisfaction with KDA's plot distribution services. Respondents showed their dissatisfaction regarding the citizen consultation, dissemination of information, condition for application, transparency of plot distribution process and quota system of plot distribution process (figure 5.10).

Figure 5.10: Residents' satisfaction with KDA's plot distribution services

Source: Field survey, 2016

5.3.3 Participation in the Planning Process of KDA

A survey of the selected neighborhoods revealed that more than 98% of respondents did not get involved in the planning process of KDA. However 98% has the willingness to participate in planning process. Among those who want to participate, around 45% would like to attend community/ward level decision making process (figure 5.11). However KDA has no provision for such decision making process. This study reveals that public hearings largely attracted those who perceive that they might be negatively affected by the proposed plan (18.4%). Others (23%) want to participate to get the information only. Therefore the level of participation is not referring active citizenship which can make KDA more accountable to the residents.

**Figure 5.11: Residents' aspirations for participating in the planning process**

- Only want to get information
- Community/ward level decision making process
- Providing opinions in the process of urban development planning
- Take responsibility in community level development

Source: Field survey, 2016

A further investigation through FGD reveals six key factors that affect the respondents' willingness to participate, namely: (a) economic condition; (b) awareness of the planning process; (c) effectiveness of communication strategies taken by the planning agency; (d) trust in planning agency; (e) sense of urgency (i.e. whether or not they were personally affected by the plan) and (f) status of social capital. A rank-order analysis based on respondents' relative judgment through the questionnaire survey also indicates 'awareness' as the most critical one (figure 5.12).

Figure 5.12: Socio-cultural factors affecting tendency to participate in planning process of KDA

Source: Field survey, 2016

5.4 Conclusion

The study findings highlight the planning agency's limitations in building up public awareness of the planning process or making a genuine effort to consult local residents to minimize potential conflicts. Furthermore, it was observed that there was no provision made within the procedure to allow further follow-on updates or feedback for those who are affected by the decision of KDA. There was similarly no provision for grievance redress mechanism to inform the community as to whether or not their objections or suggestions were incorporated in the activities of KDA. Such shortcomings further serve to dissuade people from participating in planning and decision-making processes.

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF JESSORE MUNICIPALITY'S URBAN DEVELOPMENT PLANNING FUNCTIONS

6.1 Introduction

Jessore Municipality is one of the oldest municipalities in Bangladesh. It was established in 1864. The area of the Jessore Municipality is 25.72 square km with nearly rectangular in shape and its population around 201,796 (BBS, 2011). As a local government organization Jessore Municipality represents the organizational arrangement of **devolution** and the sole agency for urban development activities.

6.2 Functions of Jessore Municipality

The functions of municipalities of Bangladesh are clearly defined by the Local Government (Paurashava) Act, 2009. Therefore the activities related to urban development of Jessore Municipality can be referred through the following box.

Box 6.1: Responsibility and Urban Development Function of Jessore Municipality according to 2nd Chapter of Local Government (Paurashava) Act, 2009

Responsibility and Function of Municipality: Section 50

(i) Main responsibilities of the municipality shall be –
  • To provide all types of citizen benefit to citizens of respective area according to established rules under this and other ordinance.
  • To make articulation between municipal administration and government employees and to take articulated programs.
  • Infrastructural development, implementation and issuing urban development plan including building control to provide municipal service to the citizen of municipal area.
  • Maintain security and discipline of citizen.
(ii) To fulfill aims of sub-section (1), municipality's responsibilities shall be –
  • Water supply and sanitation
  • Waste management.
  • Issuing plan to ensure economic and social justice.
  • Construction of road, footpath to develop communication system and construct terminal for the benefit of people's movement and goods.
  • Activities under birth and death registration act 2004 (29 no, act of 2004).
  • Traffic management planning for better transport management, passenger shade, road light parking place, bus stand and bus stop for walkers.
  • Public health and environment conservation, tree plantation and conservation.
  • Market and slaughter house setup and management.
  • Create and spread the opportunity and support to sports, games, disport, amusement and increase beautification of the locality. And
  • Any other functions under ordinance, rules, regulatory or any order from government.
(ii) Beside these functions, municipality shall perform functions described in second schedule according to its fund.

Functions provided by government: Section 51

Functions, except described in this ordinance, municipality shall perform function as:
  • Primary education
  • Cure preventing health care
  • Transport
  • Fire control and fire safety and
  • Poverty reduction in municipal area
  • Any type of charge and function after approval from government but government may order to execute through circular announcement.

Annual report of Municipality: Section 52
(i) Preparation of administrative report on activities of the municipality according to government determined form and method and publish it.

Publishing Citizen Charter: 53 Each municipality formed under this ordinance shall publish "Citizen Charter". Municipality shall follow guideline provided by government regarding ideal citizen charter for municipality. Municipality can bring change in the guideline but it is conditioned that government shall inform about this change or elaboration for concern. Following issues should be included in issuing citizen charter related rules: - True and clear details of every services of municipality. - Fees of services provided by municipality. - Qualification and process to claim and receive services. - Defined timeline to provide services. - Citizen's responsibility regarding services. - Assurance to provide services. - Solution to complaints regarding service providing. and - Punishment to break commitment of the charter.	
Use of advance Information Technology and Good Governance: Section 54 Every municipality shall use advanced technology to ensure good governance within prescribed timeline. Municipality shall manage to inform citizens regarding modern services described in citizen charter along with all government services using advanced information technology.	
Formation of Standing Committee by the Municipality: Section 55 (i) Bellow mentioned standing committees shall be formed through regulations during the first municipality meeting or work proceedings of any onward meetings and after defining two and half hours tenure, namely: - Establishment and finance. - Taxation and levy. - Accounts and audit. - Urban planning, services for citizen and development. - Rules and regularities and public security. - Communication and Infrastructural development. - Women and child. - Fisheries and livestock's. - Information and culture. - Observation, monitoring and control of prices. (ii) Except these committee municipality can form additional standing committee, specially engaging with non-government organization, such as disaster management, market management, women development, poverty reduction and slum development, health, water and sanitation, waste removal and handover etc.	
Function of Standing Committee: Section 56 Municipality grant or reject the suggestion of the committee Every activity of this standing committee is finalized after approval of the municipality.	
Citizens Presence in Meeting: Section 57 Municipality or standing committee or other any committee can permit people to be present in meeting.	
Combine Development of the Municipality: Section 59 To ensure development activities and other issues with engaging peoples of respective municipality area one or more committee shall be form, which's formation and activities are be guided by the rules.	
Engineering Works: Section 60 The issues regarding engineering planning, proposal, approval process and implementation are functioned by municipality.	
Records, Reports Etc. Preservation: Section 61 A Municipality shall – - Preserve records of its activities; - Prepare and publish such periodical reports and proceedings may be prescribed; - Adopt such other measures as may be necessary, or may be specified by the Government from time to time, for the publication of information about the working of the municipality.	

This study develops a matrix to identify urban development functions and projects performed by Jessore municipality through KII (table 6.1).

Table 6.1: Matrix for checking urban development functions and projects performed by Jessore municipality

Urban development functions	Actually performed	Undertaken projects (2010-2016)	Funding organization	Challenges to implement urban development functions & projects
Public Health	Yes	Urban Health system	UK Govt.	Lack of awareness among people
Water Supply & Drainage	Yes			Lack of funding
Articles of food and drink	No	No project, but a person is appointed to check the quality of the articles of food and drinks and he perform his duty willingly		

Town planning or Paurashava Development Plan	No, but improving	Preparation of development plan for Jessore- Benapole Highway corridor (2013) Preparation of Master Plan (Under UGIIP-III, May, 2016)	UDD DCODE DDC, ADB, GoB	Lack of planning expert in the Jessore paurashava
Land use clearance and building permission	Yes	Building layout is designed following the Building construction rules, 1996. There is no project, Direct control by the Paurashava authority but it failed to enforce the law because of political influence		Political influence accelerate the violation of rules and after getting notice several times from the municipality people don't give up illegal construction Inability to enforce the power given by the Municipal ordinance, 2009
Streets	Yes	District Town Infrastructure Development Project City Region Development Project Important Urban Infrastructure Development project	(GoB, ADB, KFW)	
Trees, parks, gardens and forests	Yes	DC Park Pauro Park (Under CRDP)	DC and Municipality (GoB, ADB, KFW)	
Development	Yes	Paurashava Development Plan (2014)	Own fund	

The above mentioned challenges are inevitable due to the lack of a master plan so that Jessore municipality can use it for land use zoning and urban development. Therefore most of the urban development functions are happening in a haphazard way depending on the priority of the donor agencies and central government organizations. However it has been observed that in absence of the master plan community are much involved in any decision making process. The requirement of land is a determining factor for such participation, which can be described through the following box.

Box 6.2: people's perceptions while designing the project

People's perception is a key for designing project for Jessore municipality. In previous projects people's perception was taken via ward councilor. As Councilor is the representative of the ward people, his decision became granted in paurashava from project design to implementation and evaluation. He performs meeting with the members of WLCC and other stakeholders and identify the urgent need for development. The community people were incorporated from planning decision making to implementation. As the plans were implemented on the land of community people so during the decision making about the plan and layout plan of this area, the purpose and benefits of the projects were discussed in front of the community people and if the community people agree with the development then projects were implemented (Key Informant Interview, 23/08/16).

6.3 Performance evaluation of Jessore municipality in delivering services
This section presents the results of the household questionnaire survey in which 50households participated along with the findings of KII and FGD. Household questionnaire survey touched upon the following three thematic areas: citizen access to services; citizen participation in service implementation, and maintenance; and citizen satisfaction towards municipality. Each of these three thematic areas was examined for four different sectors: road services, waste collection and removal, drains, building permission and local governance, with results summarized below. In addition to that the level of participation in decision making has been analyzed to identify how far the decision making process of Jessore municipality is accountable. To identify the performance of Jessore municipality satisfaction index has been developed as well.

6.3.1 Road construction and maintenance services of Jessore municipality

This section identifies the level of community participation in the road construction services of Jessore Paurashava (table 6.2); maintenance of roads (table 6.3); repairing activities (table 6.3) and grievance redress mechanism. It has been observed that Jessore municipality allows community participation in road construction and maintenance services as almost 74% respondents participated in the process of constructing or maintaining local roads. Indeed, these respondents participated voluntarily and through their community in the road construction process in their neighborhoods. They are all self-motivated people who steer the process of constructing new roads or repairing old roads by overseeing Jessore municipality's road construction activities. The strong presence of WLCC and Town level coordination committee is a determining factor for such participation.

Table 6.2: Community participation in the road construction services of Jessore municipality

Involvement of community to the construction or maintenance of the local road

Community involvement	Frequency	Percent
Yes	37	74.0
No	13	26.0
Total	50	100.0

Type of the involvement to the community

Type of the involvement	Frequency	Percent
Road implementation committee	8	21.6
Road construction monitoring	7	18.9
Evaluation committee	7	18.9
Voluntary participation to oversee community activities	15	40.5
Total	37	100.0

How are you selected?

Selected by whom	Frequency	Percent
Self-interest/Self-motivation	10	27.0
Selected by community	15	40.5
Good relation with Ward Councilor	12	32.4
Total	37	100.0

Source: Field survey, 2016

**Table 6.3: Community participation in the road maintenance services of Jessore municipality**

Who maintains the roads in your neighborhoods?

Actors in road maintenance	Frequency	Percent
Paurashava	43	86.0
Local area committee	1	2.0
Landowners work collectively	4	8.0
None	2	4.0
Total	**50**	**100.0**

If any repair is required, where do you go?

Where a people go if any repair is required	Frequency	Percent
Councilor office	35	70.0
City corporation engineer	3	6.0
Local political leader	6	12.0
Directly to mayor	2	4.0
Total	**46**	**92.0**

Source: Field survey, 2016

Table 6.3 reveals how community participates and takes necessary steps in maintaining local roads in different neighborhoods of Jessore city. It shows that Jessore municipality is the responsible authority for road maintenance in different neighborhoods of Jessore city. As shown in table 6.3, most of respondents expressed they placed their requests of repairing roads to the ward-councilor, whereas 12% respondents requested local political leaders to take actions of repairing roads. It has been observed that there is a formal system of placing a complaint regarding road construction and maintenance at Jessore municipality and 34% of the respondents have used this service and they usually got the feedback within six months after complaining.

Figure 6.1 reveals extent of community satisfaction with local road services of Jessore municipality. A large proportion of the respondents (42%) expressed their dissatisfaction with Jessore municipality in the case of road fixing. Similarly, most of the respondents (46%) expressed their dissatisfaction with cleanliness of local roads in their neighborhoods. More than 32% respondents showed their dissatisfaction with Jessore municipality responsiveness to react on complaints that was received from local residents. Although the respondents acknowledged that funding is a major challenge regarding local road services in their open comments.

Figure 6.1: Community satisfaction with local road services of Jessore municipality

Source: Field survey, 2016

6.3.2 Solid waste and drainage services of Jessore municipality
Table 6.4 provides an overview of solid waste services of Jessore municipality. It explores types of waste collection system, actors in collection system and effectiveness of garbage collection in meeting family needs. It reveals that most of households in the Jessore (about 54%) can have door to door collection system where garbage carts pick wastes from different neighborhoods. The remaining households do not have this door to door collection service. These households bring their refuse to nearby communal bins/container located in the street. The following table also reveals that most of residents (54%) use solid waste management services of Jessore municipality, whereas others are using services of other actors such as NGOs and local housing societies. Most of the residents (82.4%) state that waste is collected once every 2-3 days. However they feel that maintaining the scheduled time is still a sector where Jessore municipality can look at. They also felt that involvement of more NGOs can be an effective solution for managing the solid waste in their open comment.

Table 6.4: Solid waste management service of Jessore municipality

Which of the following waste collection services does your household use?		
Waste collection services	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Garbage cart picks up garbage	27	54.0
Garbage dumpster near home	8	16.0
Garbage dumpster for selective waste disposable	8	16.0
None of these	7	14.0
Total	50	100.0
Waste collectors	**Frequency**	**Percent**
NGO	7	14.0
Local area management	5	10.0
Citizens	1	2.0
Jessore Paurshava	29	58.0
None	8	16.0

Source: Field survey, 2016

Table 6.5 identifies the extent of community participation in the improvement of drainage services in different neighborhood. Most of the respondents (68%) confirm that their houses are connected with community drains. The current frequency of cleaning drains is unsatisfactory as the residents confirm that Jessore municipality did not clean community drains in a week. Many residents state that Jessore municipality never cleaned their adjacent drains (22%). Most of the respondents confirm that they registered formal complaints. A large number of the respondents believe that informal process is more effective than formal one. Most of the residents (64%) state that Jessore municipality often takes 3-6 months to execute actions, but 28% residents said that local authority needs a month to take actions when ward level coordination committee informed ward councilor in order to clean drains.

Table 6.5: Community participation in the improvement of drainage service of Jessore municipality

Are your house connected with drainage?		
House connected with drainage	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Yes	34	68.0
No	16	32.0
Total	50	100.0
What is the frequency of cleaning of the drains in your neighborhood?		
Frequency of cleaning drains	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Daily	4	8.0
Weekly	4	8.0
Bimonthly	15	30.0
Once a month	5	10.0
Less than once a month	10	20.0
Never cleaned	11	22.0
Don't know	1	2.0
Total	50	100.0
Have you registered any complaints regarding cleaning the drains?		
Registered complaints regarding cleaning the drains	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Yes	34	68.0
No	16	32.0
Total	50	100.0
If yes, where did you register formal complaints?		
Place of the register complaints	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Local councilor office	11	22.0
Paurshava Office	28	56.0
Total	39	78.0

Source: Field survey, 2016

Figure 6.2 reveals extent of community satisfaction with solid waste and drainage services of Jessore municipality. Substantial number of the respondents (42%) expressed their dissatisfaction with distance of collection sites from their homes as they are depending on services offered by Jessore municipality to dump their household wastes. The residents expressed their dissatisfaction with the number of garbage dumpsters as waste is collected once a week from these sites. For the size of the population and the volume of waste, the residents consider these sites insufficient. Local residents feel that the current frequency of cleaning community drains does not meet their needs. They consider the cleaning community drains insufficient in the rainy season which causes water logging in different parts of Jessore city.

Figure 6.2: Community satisfaction with solid waste and drainage services of Jessore municipality

Source: Field survey, 2016

6.3.3 Governance of Jessore Municipality

Decisions on various urban development functions, such as planning for infrastructure facilities, regular monitoring of the services, approval of municipal budget, etc., are taken in the meetings of the Jessore municipality. Representation of residents is a distinctive feature in these meetings of Jessore municipality. In Jessore, there are two different level of citizen committee; one is ward level coordination committee and another is town level coordination committee. Meetings are held periodically during which resolutions are passed on the basis of voting. According to Local Government (Paurashava) Act, 2009 participation in municipal meetings is not restricted to any category of person and may include the elected, nominated and ex-officio members, and other appointed authorities/officers associated with the local government. Besides, every meeting is open to the public. Jessore municipalities allow its citizens to take part in the local government events such as council meetings, public hearing, town level coordination meetings and municipal assembly. The representation of ward level coordination committee and town level coordination committee is very significant in the governance structure of Jessore municipality. As shown in table 6.6, 48% of total respondents attended public hearings of municipal budget. Therefore local residents have greater influence in decision making process of budget preparation and planning of infrastructure. Due to same reason, the participation of local residents in other local government events such municipal assembly, ward and town level coordination meetings are higher as well. In Jessore municipality it has been observed that 46% people are involved or opted for any unpaid communal activity that signifies the stronger voice of the community in city governance.

Table 6.6: Community experience about local government events

| Local government events	Participation		Very useful		Useful to some extent		Not useful		Don't know	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Public meetings of the municipal budget	24	48.0	5	10.0	16	32.0	4	8.0	1	2.0
Public hearing other than municipal budget	5	10.0	20	40.0	4	8.0	15	30.0	1	2.0
Local council sessions	12	24.0	12	24.0	4	8.0	13	26.0	1	2.0
Ward level coordination meetings	5	10.0	18	36.0	3	6.0	14	28.0	2	4.0
Town level coordination meeting	9	18.0	10	20.0	16	32.0	7	14.0		
Municipal assembly	4	8.0	19	38.0	3	6.0	13	26.0	1	2.0
Any unpaid communal activity	6	12.0	17	34.0	5	10.0	11	22.0	2	4.0

Source: Field survey, 2016

The aforementioned findings can be supported with the findings of key informant interview through the following box.

Box 6.3: Budgeting process of Jessore Municipality

> *The budgeting process of Jessore pourashava actually comes from the bottom. The ward councilor arrange meeting with the ward people and assess the need of his own ward. The needs of all the wards are merged and based on the available fund the authority make budget. For budgeting municipality arrange a programme in a hotel and all committees are invited to join this programme (Key Informant Interview, 23/08/16).*

Figure 6.3 shows community satisfaction with different local government events. Many residents did not agree that elections are free and fair (2.1 out of 5). In addition, many respondents believe that they do not feel safe to live in their neighborhood. Though the above table represents the active participation scenario but regarding the satisfaction level the residents are not satisfied with the existing governance structure.

Figure 6.3: Community satisfaction with local governance

Source: Field survey, 2016

Figure 6.7 explores the causes of aforementioned dissatisfaction with local governance. It has been explored that 50% of the residents feel that the decisions of those in power at local government are based on the interests of political parties rather than the interests of the population.

Table 6.7: Influence of political parties on local decision making

Response	Frequency	Percent
Never	10	20.0
Almost never	3	6.0
Only in some areas	11	22.0
To a large extent	4	8.0
Completely	10	20.0
Don't know	12	24.0
Total	50	100.0

Source: Field survey, 2016

6.3.4 Planning Permission for Buildings

Before constructing any building a plot owner needs to apply for a permission of building construction as per the Local Government (Paurashava) Act, 2009. The findings from questionnaire survey reveal that out of 50 households 88% directly applied for the plan permission (table 6.8).

Table 6.8: Getting Building permission from Jessore municipality

Response	Frequency	Percent
By applying yourself	44	88.0
Architect or architectural firm applied for you	1	2.0
Through Paurshava's employee	4	8.0
Local political leader	1	2.0
Total	50	100.0

Source: Field survey, 2016

Though they are applying directly but it has been observed that they are paying speed money (54% of the respondents) to avoid unnecessary delaying in the process. In most of the cases they are paying it to Jessore municipality officials. It has been observed that Jessore municipality is giving feedback regarding building plan permission. It has been observed that in most cases violation of setback rule is a common feedback from Jessore municipality (36%). Other feedbacks include fault in building design and problems of land entitlement (table 6.9).

Table 6.9: Feedback from Jessore municipality in the case of planning permission

Feedback	Frequency	Percent
Breaking setback rule	18	36.0
Fault in building design	14	28.0
Problem in land title	10	20.0
Other problem	8	16.0
Total	50	100.0

Source: Field survey, 2016

These types of feedback have been well acknowledged by the respondents. As it has been observed that 76% of the respondents are satisfied by getting the feedback and only 10% registered the complaints for these feedbacks. Revision of building plan is a common mechanism to accommodate the feedback and 90% of the respondents reported that after necessary correction the building plans were approved. While asking them about the complaint procedure they informed that the networking with ward councilor is a major issue to solve this type of problem. However, it has been observed that the grievance redress

mechanism is functional in Jessore municipality that can be illustrated through the following box.

Box 6.4: Existence of independent complaints office within Jessore municipality

> *The municipal authority has independent complaints cell (Committee) within the local government. People can complain in written form to the GRC cell. In the last three months there were 151 complaints and the authority solved 98 complains by oral means and some other complains were solved through written document and some were solved directly in the field observation (Key Informant Interview, 23/08/16).*

6.3.5 Socio-cultural factors for promoting accountability in Jessore municipality

In this research it has been assumed that increased participation promotes accountability. Therefore it was essential to identify the socio-cultural factors affecting citizen's tendency to participate in local governance. Therefore the findings have been presented through rank order analysis. It has been identified that lower socio-economic status such as lower education level, lack of awareness of the planning process and rights and responsibilities, may also lead to inadequate perceptions and interests in participation. The FGDs also reveal this fact that socio-economic profile often affects their tendency to participate in decision making process. However, in the case of Jessore municipality, membership of civil society organization and residents' informal network through the ward level coordination committee and town level coordination committee is very significant in affecting residents' tendency to participate in local governance (figure 6.4).

Figure 6.4: Socio-cultural factors affecting their tendency to participate in local governance

Source: Field survey, 2016

6.4 Conclusion

The above findings and discussions comprehensively explain why the level of community participation is higher in Jessore municipality. Incorporating communities while implementing project; independent complaints cell as grievance redress mechanism; participatory budgeting process; regular standing committees' meetings; and TLCC and WLCC meetings ensuring active participation of diversified group of people in the governance structure of Jessore municipality. However, the existing form of participation to make Jessore municipality accountable is merely a passive form of participation where citizens closely tied to community representatives (political/community leaders or elite groups). Therefore citizens with higher expectations and aspirations to be involved in the planning process can form more interactive and action oriented participation.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Introduction
Following the aforementioned analysis it may be therefore argued that a decentralization process is a transformation of social systems in which ensuing benefits and burdens are morally distributed among individuals within a society through different organizational arrangement. Therefore, for planning to be socially just it must be employed in recognition of the social structures at play within a given space and time, and must challenge and address institutions and 'modes of thought' that enhance accountability and participation in urban development functions. Accountability in the form of citizens' participation provides a platform where interactive and discursive actions question prevailing institutions and power relations collectively and may therefore be tools for a socially just planning system. Therefore the success of decentralization may facilitate synergy creation and strengthening in pursuit of a collective strategic action between citizens and planning organizations. Therefore this research summarizes the findings following the basic principles of planning system (figure 2.1) that may cater the true meaning of decentralization which in this case is accountability through citizens' participation.

7.2 Transparent and democratic decision-making
In terms of transparent and democratic decision-making process it has been observed that Khulna City Corporation which represents the organizational arrangement of devolution has few limitations. First of all, it has been observed that citizen participation in local decision making and policy making is weak because of only 10% of total respondents attended public hearings of municipal budget, but they confirm that the public hearing meetings were not participatory and city residents can only get information about municipal budget and other matters. As local residents did not have any influence in decision making process of budget preparation and planning of infrastructure, they were reluctant to attend in public hearings of City Corporation. The second issue is there is no platform to raise the voice of the citizen rather than communicating their agendas through elected ward councilors only.

In the case of Khulna Development Authority, the scenario is very threatening in terms of transparent and democratic decision-making process regarding urban development functions. As this organization is representing central government under the organizational arrangement of delegation they are more reluctant about citizens' participation and perception as well. It has been observed that while preparing master plan KDA emphasized participation in demand mediation, formulating planning standards and in designing development. However, it is reported that only selected representatives from relevant public departments, professional groups, civil society organizations, business groups, media, political leaders and academics were consulted to determine the preliminary design of plan preparation process. Therefore participation is happening in the form of tokenism. It has been observed that 98% of the respondents have the willingness to participate in planning process. Among those who want to participate, around 45% would like to attend community/ward level decision making process (figure 5.11). However KDA has no provision for such decision making process.

In the case of Jessore Municipality citizens are participating in decision making process through Ward Level Coordination Committee and Town Level Coordination Committee. However citizens' skeptical attitudes about the effectiveness of participation and their limited knowledge of government process have been observed. Even though a large number of citizens are not satisfied with their representation in municipal activities, 48% of total respondents attended public hearings of municipal budget. Their participation is limited largely because they feel that this participation would ultimately be ineffective in helping them influence local decision making which is highly influenced by political factors. However

the culture of transparent and democratic decision making process can be found in the case of two devoluted organization KCC and Jessore Municipality but the delegated organization KDA is lagging behind in this attribute of promotion of accountability.

7.2.1 Recommendations for ensuring transparent and democratic decision-making process

- Organizations could develop communication strategies and iterative processes to: (i) inform citizens about local government policies, programs, services, and initiatives; (ii) more effectively listen to the public; and (iii) respond to citizens' needs and incorporate their opinions into local government actions.

- Municipal authorities, and in particular municipal councilors, could find ways to educate citizens on local governance issues and to better motivate them to participate in the work of local government.

- Planning officers need to hold meetings with citizens and pay field visits to communities more frequently and on a more regular basis. These meetings need to be productive, and citizens need feedback to motivate their participation.

- There should be an institutionalized audit mechanism to evaluate organizational performance and the quality of public service provision.

- It has been observed that the Local Government (Paurashava) Act, 2009 has specific recommendations for TLCC and WLCC but the Local Government (City Corporation) Act, 2009 lacks this provision. Therefore this study recommends for the amendment of the Local Government (City Corporation) Act, 2009 to patronize TLCC and WLCC for ensuring democratic decision making in KCC.

7.3 Distribution of roles and responsibilities

To ensure accountability this research identifies that there is a burning question among the citizen that 'whom should I ask for any services'. Therefore procedural clarity is a major function for making an organization accountable. It has been observed that in the case of KCC most of the respondents confirm that they did not register any formal complaints, but they informed ward-councilor and city corporation officials informally for solving any issues reading urban development. A large number of the respondents believe that informal process is more effective than formal one. Some respondents state that there is no formal system of registering complaints. To promote accountability there should have complain receiver section and a designated nodal/ complain officer to receive citizens' complain. The focal person is supposed to distribute each complain to the respective department to redress complain. The secretary of KCC agreed that there wasn't any complain box in KCC premise during the interview session. When the researcher asked him how and through whom complains of citizens' are receiving and dealing? He replied that there isn't any assigned focal person for complain dealing in KCC. The secretary himself sometimes receive complain through mobile phone and gives verbal instruction to the respective section officer to redress complain. So there is no written document of complain dealing mechanism in KCC. One councilor also acknowledged that there is no complain box in his ward office but he receives verbal complain frequently. Therefore KCC lacks the capacity to ensure accountability as there are no initiatives taken to implement grievance mechanism.

In the case of KDA, the study found KDA has limited procedural justice; that the information seekers of KDA do not have the access to use the form for any services. These respondents get information verbally from the reception desk. Reception desk staffs only give direction to the service seekers towards respective service department. This impedes bar to citizens' accessibility to a particular quality of service that is responsive to their needs which also indicates limited awareness among actual or potential information seekers of KDA regarding citizens' right to get information. In addition there was similarly no provision for grievance redress mechanism to inform the community as to whether or not their objections or suggestions were incorporated in the activities of KDA. In Jessore Municipality, it has been observed that the grievance redress mechanism is functional.

7.3.1 Recommendations for grievance redress mechanism

- Separated Nodal Section should be institutionalized for receiving the grievances/ complains from the citizens in general and from the service recipients in particular deploying with a senior official as nodal/focal person who will facilitate the development and implementation of the grievance mechanism.

- Measures should be taken to include grievance redress mechanism in the Citizen Charter with time frame, address and contact number of the nodal/focal person.

- Local need based and culturally appropriate grievance resolution mechanism should be designed where both the citizen and the service provider can find effective solutions together. The design and operation of the grievance mechanism should consider cultural differences, such as citizens' expectations and preferences for direct or indirect negotiation.

- Adequate publicity measure is required to make the citizens aware of CC and citizens' right to complain; if services not delivered properly.

7.4 Institutional cooperation

Urban planning organizational coordination is one of the pressing issues of Bangladesh. In Bangladesh, responsibility sharing is a major planning problem, particularly, overlapping of functions in urban areas. The main reason for such a situation is that each organization works under a separate ministry, which affects the development plans having the absence of role casting principle (Rahman, 2015). In the case of Jessore city it has been observed that there is no problem in terms of institutional cooperation at the local level. However, dependency on central government for project and budget approval restricts their potential to perform in different urban development activities. In Khulna city, Khulna City Corporation as a local government and Khulna Development Authority (KDA) as planning Authority have responsibility to make coordination with each other.

During this study it has been observed that there is a problem of institutional cooperation in case of formulating the physical development projects for local areas. There is no established legal mechanism by which communication among public authorities in Khulna city is possible to maintain. It has been identified that in case of any important issue, KCC has opportunity to invite the members of other organization to participate actively in the meeting of KCC under section 49(15) of Local Government (City Corporation) Ordinance, 2009. But the problem is that there is no binding obligation of other organizations to participate in the meeting of KCC. As a result, the participation of KDA depends on the will of high officials. The conflict between KDA and KCC can be described through the following box by narrating the interview of one of the KCC officials.

Box 7.1: Problems of institutional cooperation in Khulna city

Sometimes we face boundary problems with KDA and other government organizations while implementing projects. For example, the truck terminal establishment project would be implemented by KDA in words. But they did not do that for a long time. Then KCC implemented the project within 4-5 years. Another example is a road of 'Sarak and Janapath' e.g. Khan Jahan Ali road or Power House More to Zero Point has to be divided by a divider. This responsibility is vested on KDA but people come to KCC- these are some examples of conflict. The main reason of conflict is we are under the LGRD ministry but KDA is under another ministry- Public Works. KDA holds the income generating projects (e.g. Bus Terminal, New Market etc.). According to law after development it should be handover to the KCC, but they don't. Only those are handed over where there are no income generating options. When KDA calls for a tender; there is no chance of KCC to involve in their project. So KCC has no need to coordinate with other organizations while implementing projects (Key Informant Interview, 14/07/16).

There is logic that the local government including KCC should get proper support from central government. But the debate is whether central government should give local government including KCC more priority than other public authorities in case of formulating the physical development projects for local areas or not. To justify democratic decentralization in Khulna city, the opinion of Mayor of KCC is relevant here.

Box 7.2: KCC's role to ensure coordination among public authorities

KCC can play a vital role to ensure coordination among public authorities in Khulna city. As local government, KCC has the accountability to the local people. So, all public authorities in Khulna city should coordinate with KCC so that better service can be ensured for city dwellers. In case of physical development in Khulna city, KCC can play a pioneer role to ensure coordination among public authorities in Khulna city. For this, the government should authorize KCC to maintain coordination among public authorities in Khulna city without evaluating the political identity of Mayor of KCC (Key Informant Interview, 11/12/16).

7.4.1 Recommendations for institutional cooperation
- A coordination board that will be represented with different governments, civil society, private and community organizations.

- Sharing the goals, objectives and interest of different organizations, through recognizing stakeholders and mainstreaming their role in decision making and project designing.

- Developing MSIP (multi sectoral investment plan) for implementing large scale projects. Central government will not allow any large scale project without this provision of MSIP that will clearly explain the roles, responsibilities and contributions of KCC and KDA together.

- Active participation of people, civil society, elected political representative (KCC) in the decision making process of KDA.

7.5 Conclusion
It has been observed that free, fair, regularly scheduled elections and universal suffrage are the most direct mechanism for ensuring that those who govern are accountable to the citizens (Blair, 2000). Therefore it can be concluded that local government organizations in the form of devoluted organization (KCC and Jessore Municipality) are more accountable rather than the delegated form (KDA) of decentralization. This study also assumes that civil society can become a major engine of social accountability at the local level in all these settings (Blair, 2000). Therefore incorporation of civil society organization is essential irrespective of the organizational arrangement of the local level organizations that are performing urban development activities. Decentralization on its own is just as likely to strengthen corrupt local networks as it is to promote participation and accountability (Ackerman, 2004). Therefore pro-accountability arrangements cannot be expected to arise spontaneously from devolution, but need to be intentionally structured. Therefore it can be concluded that where a single form of decentralized organization exist there is no problem of upward accountability. In terms of downward accountability which relates to the ability of the organization to be accountable to citizens; there is still some room for maneuver to ensure active citizen participation. The case of Jessore municipality justifies this aforementioned claim. However in the case of Khulna city where two different form of decentralized organization exist then the problem of upward and downward accountability prevails in a larger extent. It has been observed globally that multiple levels of governments within a single jurisdiction differ in their priority and interests, so an alliance with certain levels of government may possibly provide a shelter for citizens to be mobilized and organized for their benefit during urban development activities (Zhang et. al., 2016). Therefore this study recommends for better coordination mechanism among Khulna City Corporation and Khulna Development Authority.

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